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THE OMEN IN NOMEN: AN EXEMPLARY
DICTIONARY OF LEGAL NAMES
Peter Goodrich*

INTRODUCTION
The realization of the significance of legal names dawns
slowly and somewhat incidentally. When first studying common
law, it seemed a curiosity that the fifteenth century author and
judge who wrote the foundational three volume treatise on the
intricacies of property law, Tenures, was named Littleton, and that
the name meant "small enclosure or small holding."^ It seemed
amusing and coincidental that one of the earliest and most
inventive of the sages of common law was named Coke—originally
spelled and pronounced Cook—and that he had indeed been the
great chef or inventor and mythologist of a distinctly English legal
tradition.
It was in many respects remarkable that the
promulgator of the Corpus luris Civilis, the foundational text of
Western law, was named Justinian, from Justus meaning Justice, a
name itself derived from jus meaning law. Back then it was a
distant premonition but even so it seemed as if, more often than
could be mere coincidence, the names of great jurists augured the
events or were prescient of the lives that followed upon the
nomination.
The foreboding or omen in nomen is not simply an archaism.
Jumping to the contemporary, which in legal terms of course
means the last one hundred or so years, it would seem that
Christopher Columbus Langdell was destined to discover the case

* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, New
York. Many thanks to Rick Abel, Lauren Berlant, Neil Duxbury, Linda Mills, Tim
Murphy, Pierre Schlag, and Chuck Yablon, for erudite and interesting commentary and
other forms of reaction to earlier drafts. Chief amongst these, first amongst equals, is
Linda Mills, my spouse, my love, my other name.
1 Where names are noted, the relevant biographical and bibliographical information
can be found in the Dictionary and so is not repeated here.
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method that came to define modern American legal education.^
By the same token, it has to be more than coincidence that the
most successful of contemporary law school Deans, a Catholic
moralist and legal scholar who presided over the meteoric rise of
New York University School of Law should be named Sexton,
meaning church warden, the steward of the sacred vessels and
vestments, namely the status of the congregation or school.
Sexton is almost a synonym for Dean, which after all itself refers
historically to a Church office holder who tends to a grouping of
parishes and exercises a function of special care and inspection.
To this we must add the various possible phonetic plays upon
Sexton and sex, as most obviously, making the law school
desirable—erotic, sexy. Sexton lived up to his name.^
Again, should it surprise us that the plaintiff in a losing cause
of action for compensation for the upkeep of a horse that did not
belong to him should be named Bailey, the phonetic equivalent of
bailee, meaning gratuitous holder of someone else's chattels or
things?" In Bailey v. West, the horse had "gone West" in the sense
that the defendant purchaser renounced all interest in it, and sent
it back to the seller who in turn refused delivery. Bailey was an
intermediary who stabled the horse for several years without
request and without compensation was nominally destined to lose.'
The Court obliged by holding Bailey to be a bailee, in modem
argot a volunteer, a gratuitous undertaker of an obligation.®
Again, and finally, could either poet or novelist improve upon the
^ Christopher Columbus Langdell [1826-1906] was the Dean (originally Secretary) of
Harvard Law School from 1870-95. Langdell initiated the case method of legal
instruction, and was responsible for developing the office of the Dean into a position of
dominance. The success of his program led to what has been called the "Harvardization"
of American law schools.
See, e.g., ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL; LEGAL
EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S, at 345-50 (1983).
3 QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTIO ORATORIA V.X.30 (H.E. Butler trans., 1922), takes the
view that the name is only a primary source of argument in cases where the name is
honorific or was given for some special reason—such as by virtue of trade or profession, a
great deed or simple topography. M.T. CICERO, TOPICA 35 (T.E. Page et al. eds. & H.M.
Hubbell trans., 1949) takes the stronger view that "many arguments are drawn from
notation (etymology). This is what is meant when an argument is elicited from the history
of a name" (ex vi nominis argumentum elicitur). It is the latter position which is advocated
here.
'• See Bailey v. West, 249 A.2d 414 (R.I. 1969).
5 Id. at 415.
' Under Roman law the bailment (commodatum) must be free. JUSTINIAN'S
INSTITUTES 3.14.2 (Peter Birks & Grant McLeod trans., 1987). Similarly, in early common
law, in the absence of an assumpsit or contract of debt, the bailment is gratuitous or
nudum pactum. The bailee cannot charge but must return the chattel for proprietary
reasons. See A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE
RISE OF THE ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT 267 (1975) (discussing a 1527 King's Bench case); see
also D.J. IBBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 34-

35 (1999).
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name of the case which has traditionally been taken as authority in
English law for the proposition that an engagement ring cannot be
recovered in the event of the marriage not taking place. In the
case of Zamet v Hymarf it was Hyman—phonetically of course
hymen—who successfully argued that the ring could be kept, that
the gift was intact and that the promise should not be broken.**
While it may sound strange to contemporary ears, the
attribution of causes to names has a venerable history in both
philology and law. The roots or derivations of the name have
traditionally been taken to bear considerable importance as
denominations of character and quality. In nominalist terms, a
name is the sign of a difference and its attribution is the result of
convention or of the original legislative act of naming. Thus,
according to one extreme version of legal nominalism propounded
in an early common law treatise on legal logic, a mid-sixteenth
century work entitled The Rule of Reason: "[H]e is half hanged,
that has an evil name," as for example someone ill-fatedly called
Pope during the English Reformation.' In the spirit of attention to
the meaning of names and to the marriage of the sign to that which
it notes, the present Dictionary is devoted to elaborating the legal
and political significances of juristic names. In Part I, the legal
history of names and naming is briefly outlined. In Part II, the
code or principles underlying the formulation of dictionary entries
are set out. The Exemplary Dictionary of Legal Names then
ensues, followed in Part IV by a cumulative statement of the
principles that can be derived from the nominations.

I.

THE LAW OF NAMES

In that it is my intention to provide a dictionary of practical
import and use, I will refrain from offering a lengthy tract on the
philosophy of nominal essences or the linguistics of reference. I
will restrict my remarks on the legal history of names in the main
to the more common observations of forensic rhetoricians and
other Jurists concerned with the logic or method of law. Whatever
sources one starts from, the study of names is a branch of
etymology, the excavation of the origin and connotations of words.
' Zamet v Hyman [1961] 3 All E.R. 933. Zamet, appropriately enough, from the
Hebrew Tzamaret, meaning tree top.
8 Id. at 942.
' THOMAS WILSON, THE RULE OF REASON, CONTAINING THE ART OF LOGIQUE, at
sig 48v (London, 1553). Wilson goes on to argue that the name is in essence a metaphor
for the thing designated or denominated.
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The name is in this signification a sign that represents or
symbolizes the qualities of its first bearers. A knowledge of names
was closely aligned to codes of honor and the hierarchies of
genealogy or lineage and thus to law. The omina in nomina is
precisely the past in the present, the body subject to the law of its
calling or name.'"
To begin with the word name or nomen itself, the root is the
Latin verb nosco meaning "to know." To name, as in to nominate
or to denominate, means to assign a meaning, to predicate an
understanding or interpretation of the subject that bears the name.
The name is here a title and a mark of honor, a point which is
frequently iterated by noting that the words name and nobility
share a root in the verb nosco. The contrary of the honor of
nomenclature or name is thus ignominy or loss of name and status,
which in Roman law was referred to as damnatio memoriae or
silencing of the name." In either case, to borrow from Plato in the
Cratylus, the name is conceived of as an act of legislation.^^ The
name has a meaning by convention or law, a point that starts off
the Cratylus with a discussion of the significance of the name
Hermogenes as having its roots in Hermes, the name of the Greek
God of speech and interpretation." Similarly, though in a contrary
form, Aristotle in the Rhetoric plays upon names as a topic of
arguments, and famously uses the example of the tyrant Draco, an
early lawgiver whose fame derived from a code of laws that
punished every crime, however minor, by death.
Aristotle
observes that his laws "are not the laws of a man but of a dragon—
they are so cruel.'"" In other words, it was fated that someone
whose name means dragon would produce profoundly cruel and
inhuman laws. More playfully, the Renaissance jurist Agrippa
starts out his satirical treatise Of the Vanitie and Uncertaintie of
Artes and Sciences by opining defensively that the "loowsie
Grammarians will make a stirre, and with their Etymologies vppon
Igor Stramignoni, At the Margins of the History of English Law: the institutional, the
socio-political, and the 'blotted out', 22 LEGAL STUD. 420, 438 (2002). "Rather, what one
would aim to do, in uncovering such history, would be to walk back towards the incipit of
(non-historical) time in order to bring out the inauguration, on each occasion, of the
juridification of the ordinary—to begin with, how people and things and events came to be
given legal names." Id.
" For a discussion of damnatio memoriae, see PIERRE LEGENDRE, LE DESIR

POLITIQUE DE DIEU: ETUDE SUR LES MONTAGES DE L'ETAT ET DU DROIT 232-34
(1988).
12 PLATO, CRATYLUS, reprinted in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO
INCLUDING THE LETTERS 421 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Benjamin
Jowett trans., 1963).
12 Id. at 426-27, lines 384c-d, 408a-b.

11 ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE 1400 B (Edward Meredith Cope ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1877).
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Agrippa will geue me a goutie name.""
Whether the name represented the truth or in satirical form
the contrary of the subject named, nomination played a primary
role in the theory of meaning and in the practice of law. The name
was a law, both in the sense of Plato's fictive history of language in
which it was the product of a legislative act, and in the sense of
being itself a representation of a meaning or truth that had to be
followed. In one obscure gloss on the Digest, attributed to
Accursius, the name is said to inhere in or stick to a man's bones:
nomina, quae ossibus hominum inhaerent}^ The corporeal and the
incorporeal are bound together in the name and the rationality or
reason of their combination is ideally captured through
nomination. Whatever the linguistic roots of this notion of
etymology it serves to illustrate the key theme that the name is a
bond, an obligation or contract with the past, as well as a
prediction of future behavior.
While it may currently be popular to ignore the Latin sources
of common law, it is worth staying briefly with the Digest and its
various interpreters. The classical compilation begins with the
issue of names and specifically with the question: "from whence
does the name of the law descend?"" One translation of that
question is that the law descends precisely from names and it is the
law of names that guarantees the places of subjectivity and the
social roles that the subject can enter. The name is here the
guarantee or law of the subject and the power of naming or latterly
interpreting names and thence words was precisely the power and
the art of the lawyer. By the same token, the practice of law was
the interpretation of words of which names were the exemplum or
primary form. The study of law was defined, amongst other things,
as the science of the meaning of words and as one Renaissance
jurist put it, "without agreement as to what names designate there
could be no discussion."" The power of law was thus not simply
HENRY CORNELIUS AGRIPPA, OF THE VANITE AND VNCERTAINTIE OF ARTES
AND SCIENCES 6 (Catherine M. Dunn ed., Northridge: California State University Press
1974) (1569). One root of Agrippa is undoubtedly the Latin gutta from which gout or
gowty derive. The more obvious root is the French grippe, meaning seized or gripped by,
from which we derive the modern flu or influenza. In either case, Agrippa—ad or to, and
grippe or gutta—would suggest, in one interpretation at least, a propensity toward the
illness or disposition named.

I*" The gloss is taken from CORPUS lURlS CiVILIS COMMENTARIIS ACCURSII D 44.7.3
(1627), but can be pursued more easily via the erudite recapitulation in Erich Genzmer,
Nomina Ossibus Inhaerent, in 1 MELANGES PHILIPPE MEYLAN, at 159 (1963).
1' Digest 1.1.1.1 unde nomen iuris descendat. Elaborated upon in PIERRE LEGENDRE,
L'EMPIRE DE LA VERITE 51 (1983).
18 GIRALOMO CAGNOLI, COMMENTARII DE REGULIS IURIS 783 (Lyon: n.p. 1593)
(1576). This work is discussed in LAN MACLEAN, INTERPRETATION AND MEANING IN
THE RENAISSANCE: THE CASE OF LAW (1992) (discussing the philosophy of
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that of interpreting what Coke called the vocabula artis of legal
terms," it was also the manifestation of the prior power of naming,
which the juristic tradition captures in the term jurisdiction or law
{juris) of speech (dictio).
If the name inheres in the bones, it is a sign not simply of
knowledge and nobility but of the viscera of honor and degree, of
blood and lineage. It is in this sense, according to Sir John Feme,
a barrister of the Inner Temple who authored an early common
law systematization of the law of arms and ensigns, that names
were to be understood as meanings borrowed from "some quality,
or action exhibited, by the first parent."^" He goes on to expand
upon this theme, suggesting that:
commonly was this regard always duly observed, that names
were given, to every man most apt for the explaining of his
estate, life, conditions, qualities or personage. And therefore,
amongst the learned Heralds and armorists... is this rule
observed: that a nominibus ad arma, sequuntur argumenta.
That is: reasons or arguments, taken from the names of men, do
consequently follow, to their arms.^'
He opines finally that "names were invented to know men by
them."^^ The phonetic coincidence that "know men" and "nomen"
are identical, that the sentence forms a species of epistemological
onomatopoeia simply requires noting.
Feme's theory of names is genealogical in that it depends
upon lines of descent, antiquity and the proofs of time. The
doctrine of names dictated that all names ideally signified "the first
ancestor to have been either of the like authority, office or
dignity... or possessed of the same possessions, and places,
whereof they were denominate.
In this doctrine, etymology was
the study of the meaning of names as the sign or figure of a prior
sense. The Ramistic rules of method, shared by both the logics
and the rhetorics of early common law, dictated that the origin of
the name or word was the souree of its meaning and the index of
its truth. The central text of the reception of the Corpus luris,
book 50, appropriately titled on the meaning of words {de
interpretation that emerges from the Renaissance reception of these Roman fragments
and maxims).

" 1 SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 6R (Garland Publ'g 1979) (1628).
SIR JOHN FERNE, THE BLAZON OF GENTRIE 224 (London, John Winder 1586). For
a discussion, see PETER GOODRICH, LANGUAGES OF LAW FROM LOGICS OF MEMORY
TO NOMADIC MASKS 111-48 (1990) (discussing "legal writing systems").
21 FERNE, supra note 20, at 225.
22 Id. See also JOHN GUILLIM, A DISPLAY OF HERALDRY: MANIFESTING A MORE
EASY ACCESS TO THE KNOWLEDGE THEREOF 3R-V (London, Roycroft 1679) (1610).
22 FERNE, supra note 20, at 227.
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verborum significatione), explicitly states "that by the designation
'name' the thing is meant.The common law tradition took up
this principle of nomination in multiple ways from rules relating to
the literae or words of the text to principles of logic and the
rhetoric of their presentation.
Logic and law were both borrowed from the French during
the Renaissance and with respect to logic that meant the critical
scholasticism of Petrus Ramus.The key work was the Logic and
we there find the discussion of "notation or etymology" to be
concerned precisely with names and what they represent: "for
words are nothing else but notes of matters signified."^® In the
language of logic, the name was the genus of which words were the
species. In proof of this conception, Ramus goes on to state:
The Hebrews used to give their sons and their daughters names
which might ever put them in remembrance of some point of
religion.... The Greeks did use the same ... [as] Philotheus
which is lover of God; Demosthenes, the strength of the
people ... , [though] an enemy of Demosthenes would argue
that he should not be so named but rather Demovorus,
devourer of the people
Physicians also give names to their
herbs after the names of their inventors.^'
The name was the signifier of the thing and as in logic so in law it
was the knowledge of names that constituted the professional
learning of the lawyer.
The Logike of Ramus was translated fairly directly into
common law, the exemplary work being that of Abraham Fraunce
who wrote the first logic for lawyers and was doing no more than
following contemporary tradition in arguing that: "notation or
etymologie, is the interpretation of the word. For words be notes
of things, and of all words eyther derivative or compound, you may
yielde some reason fet [made] from the first arguments, if the
notation be well made."^® Fraunce follows this statement of first
2" THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 528-34, at 50.16.4 (T. Mommsen et al. eds., 1985)
(Paulus, Nominis appellatione rem significari).
25 On the influence of Ramus, see Peter Goodrich, Ars Bablativa: Ramism, Rhetoric,
and the Genealogy of English Jurisprudence, in LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY,
THEORY, AND PRACTICE (Greg Leyh ed., 1990).
PETRUS RAMUS MARTYR, THE LOGIC OF THE MOST EXCELLENT PHILOSOPHER
51 (London, Thomas Vautrollier 1574).
2' Id. at 52-53.

28 ABRAHAM FRAUNCE, THE LAWIERS LOGIKE, EXEMPLIFYING THE PRAECEPTS OF
LOGIKE BY THE PRACTISE OF THE COMMON LAWE 51 (London, William How 1588).
The sources and uses of this concept of etymology are usefully listed in ERNST CURTIUS,
EUROPEAN LITERATURE AND THE LATIN MIDDLE AGES 495-500 (Willard R. Trask
trans., 1973) (1948). For Cicero etymology was called notation, though for Quintilian the
literal rendering should be veriloquium (true speech) or origination. See OUINTILIAN,
supra note 3, Book I vi, at 28-29.
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principles with a lengthy series of illustrations of names, including
the Aristotelian example of Draco's laws, and concludes not
simply that names define the origin of words but that the best
arguments are drawn from those origins. After presenting a
lengthy series of illustrative etymologies, Fraunce concludes by
castigating his contemporaries at the Inns of Court and stating:
I have purposely inserted a number of notations, for that I
would make it plain, how the notion of the thing is oftentimes
expressed by the notation of the word, contrary to the
preiudicate opinion of some seely penmen, and illogical
lawyers, who thinke it a fruiteles poynt of superfluous curiositie,
to understand the words of a mans own profession.^'
The root of the English word was most usually the Latin, and the
origin of the common law modes of reasoning was similarly most
often the Roman code. In this fashion, the first dictionary of
English simply listed rhyming transliterations of the Latin,^ and
the early law dictionaries borrowed their title from Book 50 of the
Digest and listed the origin of the terms of the law by reference to
their derivations in Latin, French, Saxon, Norse and Old or Middle
English.^' Names were the notes of things in logic and in law, and
interpretation best started from the source or root of the name,
such providing the most fitting and the most persuasive argument.
To which it remains only to add that the arguments drawn (or
technically, invented) from names could be made either pro or
contra—for or against—the original meaning. The name was
rhetorically a figure, a metaphor or metonymy of its root and it
could be used etymologically, as also ironically, humorously, or
incorrectly as the occasion or the cause demanded. In the logic of
antitheses or errors (elenchs) Agrippa would mean prone to gout,
Hermogenes was a poor speaker, Demosthenes a devourer of the
people; or in the common law tradition, little John was so named
because he was huge, and, according to Fraunce, "a Woman is a
woe man, because she worketh a man woe.'"^

2'' FRAUNCE, supra note 28, at 56. See also SIR JOHN DODERIDGE, THE ENGLISH
LAWYER DESCRIBING A METHOD FOR THE MANAGING OF THE LAWS OF THIS LAND 66
(Prof. Books 1980) (1631) (providing a comparable statement of the rules of the English
legal method: "deflnitio nominis est qua vocis significatio explicatur").

'I' PETER LEVINS, MANIPULUS VOCABULORUM: A DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH AND
LATIN WORDS (Camden Soc'y 1867) (1570).
Most notably, see JOHN CowELL, THE INTERPRETER OR BOOK CONTAINING THE
SIGNIFICATION OF WORDS (Cambridge, Legat 1607). Cowell was a civilian but also one
of the first systematisers of common law. See also JOHN RASTELL, AN EXPOSITION OF
CERTAIN DIFFICULT AND OBSCURE WORDS, AND THE TERMS OF THE LAWS OF THIS
REALM (London, Stationers Co. 1615) (1527).
FRAUNCE, supra note 28, at 56.
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According to Montaigne, no man should be called happy until
after he is dead.^^ The same logic would suggest that no name is
secure until its bearer is deceased. The living can always still bring
glory, infamy, or simply a change of significance to their
nomination. It is for this reason that the common law judiciary
historically favored citing only dead authors and one of the only
other dictionaries of common law names, the Biographical
Dictionary of the Common Law, begins by announcing that due to
the problems of selection, "[n]o living persons have been
included."^" The present Dictionary takes a different, more
optimistic position and favors the living but does not exclude the
dead. In that its purpose is practical rather than antiquarian, the
names of the living make better objects of argument and
interpretation, of polemic, humor, and extrapolation, than do the
dead whom the living will after all join soon enough. In the
goodness of time, this Dictionary will have been about the dead
and it simply suffices to say that any inaccuracies that may be
discovered can thus be attributed to the fact that the subjects,
including of course the author, were still extant and therefore
fallible and mutable at the time of writing.
The principle of inclusion, in line with the early juristic
doctrine of names, is broadly that of distinction or of the mark of
difference. In an epigrammatic sense, those who are included have
lived up to their name, and inversely, those who do not live up to
their name, fail to live up to their name and so are not included.
The subjects selected for entry in the Dictionary have by celebrity
or infamy, by dint of brilliant or egregious acts, indicated a passion
or drive that not only distinguishes them and so renders them in
some facet unique but also suggests an element of unconscious or
corporeal motivation. Further, that the name inheres in the bones
indicates in a pre-Freudian yet nonetheless structural manner that
the subject incorporates and expresses a cause that is interior and
yet greater than the merely individual.
In this aspect the
Dictionary has a normative ambition, which is that of resurrecting
the polemical art of arguments ad hominem and, in a modern
translation, ad feminam, which is to say, arguments predicated
33 MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, THE COMPLETE WORKS OF MONTAIGNE: ESSAYS,
TRAVEL, JOURNAL, LETTERS 33 (Donald M. Frame trans., Stan. Univ. Press 1943)
(1588).
3'" BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE COMMON LAW, at v (A.W.B. Simpson ed.,
1984).
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upon the individual, and specifically upon their distinction and
their name.
The use of the names of extant jurists, of the living, renders
the process of selection a matter of some delicacy and not a little
tact. It also means that the subjects of selection—granted that we
rapidly forget the dead—are more numerous. It is for this reason
that the Dictionary is exemplary, meaning that it uses examples or
illustrations rather than making any attempt to be comprehensive.
The exemplary is didactic and seeks not only to represent a thesis
by way of examples but also thereby to illustrate the importance of
names to arguments. In normative terms, such arguments drawn
from names mix a variety of recognized legal genres. They address
not only the critical appreciation of distinction and achievement,
but also the humorous {rem levem) and the polemical. It is the
predicate of the analyses which follow that it is both more honest
and frequently more useful to acknowledge a substrate of juristic
argument that is nominal or ad hominem. While such arguments
may seem to belong more properly to the ceremonial or epideictic
genre, they are also political and forensic, a feature of the ad
hominem that should not in truth surprise lawyers who are forever
concerned with questions of character and of motive, as well as
with the singularity and hence intimacies of advocacy and
representation.^^
Each entry will be formulated according to an outward
movement from the lexical to the semantic and thence to an
interpretation. The first annotation will be phonetic and will offer
a pronunciation of the name. Where relevant there will be a
parenthetical listing of institutional affiliation and in those rare
cases where date of birth and death are significant these will also
be appended. This will be followed by the etymology or root
meaning of the name, and where relevant of rhyming or
phonetically equivalent words.
Etymology is followed by
genealogy, and historical uses of the name will be used to
supplement their etymology by means of biographical and
historical references. The forename or names will be analyzed
where they are deemed significant—which is usually—and on
occasion, computer spell check variants upon names, as for
example Headgear for Heidegger, Jurassic for Jurist, will be
included. Finally, a rhetorical figure will be attached to each

The tradition of juristic polemic and specifically the genres of apology and
antirrhetic, of defence and denunciation, are discussed in Peter Goodrich, Antirrhesis:
Polemical Structures of Common Law Thought, in THE RHETORIC OF LAW 57 (Austin
Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1994).
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nomination as the emblem of its interpretation.^® By way of
illustration I will use my own name which for reasons of propriety
does not appear in the Dictionary:
Goodrich, Peter. (Gud-ridge) is from the Old English Godric,
composed of god meaning good and ric meaning power or rule.
Peter is from Petros meaning rock and with well known biblical
significance as the name of the first apostle and the foundation
stone of the Christian Church.^'
The rhetorical figure of
interpretation is persiflage, the inverter of the serious and the
erudite pursuer of trifles. Fated to be a founder and good ruler, a
theologian of the law. Biographically we find that Peter Goodrich
was indeed a founder, and specifically was founding Dean of
Birkbeck Law School in the University of London in 1992, a
School which rapidly became one of the top five law schools in
Britain. Phonetically, gud-ridge also suggests vision or seeing over
the ridge, and hence a good interpreter. Amongst Goodrich's
^ To save the text from an innundation of unnecessary footnotes, I will here list the
sources used for etymologies, word lists, and rhetorical figures. The roots of names have
been pursued mainly through PATRICIA HANKS & FLA VIA HODGES, A DICTIONARY OF
SURNAMES (1988); P.H. REANEY ET AL., A DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH SURNAMES
(1995); ALFRED J. KOLATCH, COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH AND HEBREW
FIRST NAMES (1984); J.W. FREEMAN, DISCOVERING SURNAMES: THEIR ORIGINS AND
MEANINGS (3d ed. 2001); THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY (C.T.
Onions ed., 1966). Other word lists used are THOMAS BLOUNT, GLOSSOGRAPHIA, OR A
DICTIONARY INTERPRETING ALL SUCH HARD WORDS (London, 1656); J. H. BAXTER &
CHARLES JOHNSON, MEDIEVAL LATIN WORD LIST (1934); ENTICK'S NEW LATIN
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (William Crakelt ed., 1822). Lexical recourse has otherwise been
to THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 1989), and
to A LATIN DICTIONARY (Charton T. Lewis & Charles Short eds., 1975) (1879). On the
historical provenance of names I have consulted primarily THE DICTIONARY OF
NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY: 1941-1950 (L.G. Wickham Legg & E.T. Williams eds., 1959).
For rhetorical figures I have resorted primarily to GEORGE PUTTENHAM, THE ART OF
ENGLISH POESIE (Gladys Doidge Willock & Alice Walker eds., Cambridge Univ. Press
1936) (1589), and HENRY PEACHAM, THE GARDEN OF ELOQUENCE CONTAINING THE
FIGURES OF GRAMMER AND RHETORIC (London, H. Jackson 1577).
I have
supplemented and updated these, as occasion has required, by reference to WILLARD R.
ESPY, THE GARDEN OF ELOQUENCE: A RHETORICAL BESTIARY (1983); BRIAN
VICKERS, IN DEFENCE OF RHETORIC (1988); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RHETORIC (Thomas O.
Sloane ed., 2001).
^ It is only fair to observe that some commentators on this paper have taken a
different view of the etymology of the name. One correspondent notes Old English roots
of "gdd" and "riks" denoting aristocratic birth, high moral stature, and worldly wealth.
Noting the irony of such a name for a radical lawyer—it is clearly a contrary—he remarks
that "in modern usage, 'good and rich' may refer not to moral or material worth, but to a
complex and layered irony, as in 'isn't it rich.'" Another correspondent notes, in a
somewhat more direct vein that rich, and thence Richard, is familiarized as Dick. She
continues: "Coincidentally, Peter is a saint but also means 'dick' in the current sexual
vernacular. This is to say that the first name, the handle, undoes its sanctity as it rolls
along, while the second name, the name of the father, virtually explodes or implodes by
virtue of its insistence on abstraction and its suppression of the dick, the historical body,
that props it up." Letters to Peter Goodrich (on file with author).
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books are Legal Discourse and Oedipus Lex, both works which,
together with the present Dictionary, suggest a facility with
questions of interpretation and a comprehensive understanding ot
the origins and significances of legal names.

III.

AN EXEMPLARY DICTIONARY OF LEGAL NAMES

Abel, Richard (Ay-bull) [UCLA] Abel from the Hebrew Hevel^
meaning breath, vigor, and figuratively vanity or worthlessness.
This latter connotation doubtless also derives from the biblical
Abel, the son of Adam who was murdered by Cain, and whose
name was used by various millenarian cults of suffering mnocence
in the Middle Ages. Richard from Old English ric meaning power
and hard meaning hardy, brave, strong. Phonetically able m the
sense of full of ability. Rhetorical figure penstasis or that of the
contextualist. Destined to shine vigorously but also to be brilliant
and unworldly and hence to suffer the pangs of innocence.
Preordained to be a critic and chastiser of the legal academy for its
intellectual want, for its laziness, and for its lack of ambhion.
Highly successful scholar, a founder of the modern tradition of
sociology of law and specifically focused upon the sociology of the
legal profession. Like most legal academics whose persona is
intellectual or academic rather than vocational and professional,
he is likely someone who is unhappily lodged m law school
environments. Started his career at Yale but was refused tenure
for his leftist or critical legal views. Author of numerous highly
influential books on the legal profession around the world.
Nominally destined to follow closely upon the heels of the founder
or Adamic figure and thence to be punished—literally or
metaphorically—for reasons of jealousy or of narcissistic rivalry.
38 PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE: STUDIES IN LINGUISTICS, RHETORIC AND
LEGA? AI AL? S (1987); PETER GOODRICH, OEDIPUS LEX: PSYCHOANALYSIS,
HISTORY LAW (1995).
.
R -I

J S

39 I note here, for no reason other than the circumstantial, that Abel is a recent fami y
name, changed from Ablowitz in the post-war period
Here and
Dictionary I have taken the view that analysis should attend to the name
^
to any such distraction as the original or proper or simply prior name. My ]"st'^tory
argument in relation to this practice is obviously that the change of name is
better
evidence of motivation than even the original. The changed name, like the synonym,

"SL

L Abd

"'R^CMRDL" AML

,>,g E«,ua,io«s: Ho. SEooU La. ScLooL
PROFESSION IN ENOLAND AND WALES

(1988); LAWYERS: A CRITICAL READER (Richard L. Abel ed., 1997); RICHARD L. ABEL,
AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989).
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Preordained, in short, a purist who would boldly and thence
critically study power and its legal manipulations.
Ackerman, Bruce (Ache-er-mun) [Yale] Etymologically from
German Acker meaning field or agriculture (from which acre), and
mediately from the English where acer was a status name under
the feudal system referring to a bond tenant who was a ploughman
for a manor—an acre man. Bruce is from the Old Norse for island
in a swamp. In the Middle Ages it became a popular Scottish
name, associated most famously with Robert the Bruce who
defeated the English at Bannockburn in 1314. Rhetorical figure,
synecdoche or part for whole, and which Puttenham terms the
figure of quick conceit. Destined by name to work—to be a
tenant—for long periods of time at one place, and to be much
infused with questions of status and the hierarchies that it
generates and also expresses. By inclination and nomination thus
preordained to work on questions of territory, of land, nation, and
constitutional law. An "acre-man" is in this sense, the oldest of
senses, one who ploughs the territory, one who inscribes the
tellurian laws—the leges terrae—of a common or local law.
Author of We the People, a multi-volume theory of constitutional
law; editor of a collection of essays on Bush v GoreP Shares his
forename both with Robert the Bruce and Bruce Willis, the actor
made famous by the Diehard movies. A tendency thus to
polemical heroism of a nationalistic ilk.
Balkin, Jack (Ball-king) [Yale] Etymologically from the French
Baud meaning corpulent or rotund, and later bold and
occasionally joyful. Jack, from the Hebrew Jacob, meaning held
by the heel; and in its Anglicized form, a diminutive of John,
meaning a saucy or paltry fellow, a sailor. Rhetorical figure
aposiopesis or breaking off. Destined to be large, literally, which is
to say physically, and metaphorically, which is to say spiritually.
Preordained to open up new fields and then to balk or fall back.
Balkin has gained a considerable influence and great career
success through translating—some would say bowdlerizing or
balkanizing—other disciplines and continental traditions into the
domain of law. Has moved rapidly from one field to another, from
literary theory, to semiotics, to political philosophy, to
constitutional law, to virtual reality and back. Prolific author of
law review articles including an article on Deconstructive Practice
and Legal Theory, and of a book entitled Cultural Software.
"2 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); BUSH V. GORE:
THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002).
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Shares his forename with "Jack of all trades.""^ As if in
anticipation of the Dictionary, and in a rigorous attempt to
exemplify his name, Balkin's most recent work is
uncharacteristically direct and titled The Laws of Change: I Ching
and the Philosophy of Life. Unrelated to positive law, this book
addresses the constancy of flux in everyday life. It purports to
offer a species of advice that lawyers have historically been most
signally ill-equipped to provide, namely a coda for living well.'*^
Barron, Anne (Bare-ohn) [London School of Economics] From
the Old French baro referring originally to service in the baronial
household or used as a nickname for a peasant or servant who had
ideas above their station. Alternate etymology from Old English
beorn meaning young warrior, and the Germanic heran meaning
bear. Anne from the Irish Annach meaning iniquity. Rhetorical
figure meiosis, meaning mockery or diminution. Fated to fight
against—ambivalently to admire—all orders of precedence and to
rail against hierarchy as such. Whatever her motives—good or
ill—preordained to criticism and, some might further infer,
discontent. A feminist legal scholar and critical legal theorist,
author of numerous articles attacking not only the hegemonic
jurisprudence, but also feminism, postmodernism, critical legal
studies, and on one occasion, me."' A powerful polemicist and a
salient if barbed critic.
Berlant, Lauren (Bear-Ion) [Chicago University, Department of
English] From German brillant meaning diamond and thence the
French briller to shine or glitter. Lauren from the Latin laurus
meaning laurel tree. A name given in the Middle Ages to many
minor saints, including hermits, martyrs, and abbots, perhaps
because of a propensity for sitting under laurel trees. Rhetorical
J. M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1986).
For commentary on that piece, see the critique in Pierre Schlag, "Le Hors De Texte, C'est
Moi": The Politics of Form and the Domestication of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1631 (1990), and Peter Goodrich, Europe in America: Grammatology, Legal Studies,
and the Politics of Transmission, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 2033 (1998). For approving liberal
certification of the piece, see Neil MacCormick, Reconstruction after Deconstruction: A
Response to CLS, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 539 (1990). See also J. M. BALKIN,
CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY (1998).

^ JACK M. BALKIN, THE LAWS OF CHANGE; I CHING AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE

(2002).

Anne Barron, Legal Discourse and the Colonization of the Self in the Modern State,
in POST-MODERN LAW: ENLIGHTENMENT, REVOLUTION AND THE DEATH OF MAN 107
(Anthony Carty ed., 1990); Anne Barron, Spectacular Jurisprudence, 20 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 30 (2000); Anne Barron, Feminism, Aestheticism and the Limits of Law, 8
FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 275 (2000). My cryptic riposte to the last piece is contained in
Peter Goodrich, Barron's Complaint, 9 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 149 (2001).

2003]

THE OMENINNOMEN

1323

figure climax or the marching figure. Included here for her
indelible influence upon interdisciplinary legal studies. Destined
ineluctably to an academic and literary trajectory of brilliance.
Preordained to scholarship that glistens between topoi and
disciplines. One who shares her light with many, who exposes her
soul under the laurel tree, part martyr, part leader. Author of an
interview under the title "Loose Lips," suggesting a certain
suffering for words used, for things said or done. Long-time editor
of leading literary and cultural journal. Critical Inquiry.
Coruscating proponent of the concepts of the personal archive and
of the intimate public sphere."® Has written extensively on
intimacy, on zoning, on "public sex." Author of a book with a
marching title: The Queen of America Goes to Washington City.*''
As with any diamond, can be rough as a critic, or can cut to the
quick."®
Bodenheimer, Edgar (Bohdin-high-ma) [University of California
Davis, 1908-1991] From the Frisian Bodo to announce, and the
Hebrew chaim meaning life. Edgar from the Old English ead
meaning fortune and gar meaning spear. Rhetorical figure
anachinosis or figure of the impartner, meaning someone who in
pleading or persuading alerts the reader or judge to the nature of
the adversary. Nominally fated to be a messenger of good fortune
or proponent of life. Author of Power, Law, and Society, a treatise
on the legal theory of Friedrich Nietzsche which concludes with
the argument that an historical conspectus of the accumulated
good and evil caused by law would necessarily conclude that law
has done more good than ill."' Fortune's wheel favors law and
Bodenheimer flung this good news to his contemporaries. Not
much read since then.
Bottomley, Anne (Bo-tomb-li) [Kent Law School, England] From
Old English botm meaning broad valley and leah, wood or
clearing. Anne from the Hebrew Chana meaning "Gracious."
Phonetically proximate to bottom, meaning foundation or

Lauren Berlant, '68 or Something, 21 CRITICAL INQUIRY 124 (1994); Lauren
Berlant, Intimacy: A Special Issue, in INTIMACY 86 (Lauren Berlant ed., 2000); Lauren
Berlant & Michael Warner, Sex in Public, in INTIMACY 311 (Lauren Berlant ed., 2000).

LAUREN BERLANT, THE QUEEN OF AMERICA GOES TO WASHINGTON CITY:
ESSAYS ON SEX AND CITIZENSHIP (1997).
Lauren Berlant, Two Girls, Fat and Thin, in REGARDING SEDGWICK: ESSAYS ON
QUEER CULTURE AND CRITICAL THEORY (Stephen M. Barber & David Clark eds.,

2002).

EDGAR BODENHEIMER, POWER, LAW, AND SOCIETY: A STUDY OF THE WILL TO
POWER AND THE WILL TO LAW (1973).
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fundament. Rhetorical figure gnome, the director, sage sayer, or
sentential. Destined to found and to explore foundations and to
do so with great style and resilience. Preordained to be a founder
who clears a path, explores and charts the bases of disciplines and
the roots of academic style. A founder of the European critical
legal studies movement, she also has considerable gravitas or
presence within British feminist legal studies. She has written
extensively on the process of law teaching and the politics of
theory.'" She is editor of an influential book series titled Feminist
Perspectives upon the Foundational Subjects of LawF
Bracton, Henry de (Brack-tun) [Judge and Writer, 1210-1268]
From Old English braech meaning to break land, or plough for the
first time. Henry, Germanic from haim meaning home and ric
meaning power. Rhetorical figure aetiologia or giver of causes.
Destined to be the first in his field, to make the first cut. In light of
the forename Henry, clear that this initial tilling of the land would
be local and legal. Author of De legibus et consuetudimbus
Angliae (On the Laws and Customs of England) which Maitland
described as "the flower and crown of English jurisprudence.
The treatise was the first attempt to provide an exposition of the
whole of English law—the laws of the plough meaning local and
inscribed laws and customs, the leges terrae—and stood alone m
that regard for five centuries. Origins, and particularly legal
origins, are always obscure and recent scholarship has thrown
serious doubt upon whether Bracton was author of the De legibus.
It was quite possibly a collective work which Bracton edited
(redacted), and now, as regards authorship and legitimacy, must be
placed within the domain of "time beyond the memory of man" or
"time immemorial," a legal time that precedes authorship, books
and all need of historical justification. In theology and law,
antiquity triumphs over novelty, and the ultimate cause is the
cause of causes, the fiction of the absolute or, in Bracton, the floral
figure of a home and thence a domestic law originating before time
and memory."
50 FEMINIST THEORY AND LEGAL STRATEGY (Anne Bottomley & Joanne Conaghan
eds 1993)' Anne Bottomley, Theory is a Process Not an End: A Feminist Approach to the
Practice of Theory, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON LAW & THEORY 25 (Janice
Richardson & Ralph Sandland eds., 2000).
T
51 See, e.g., FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON THE FOUNDATIONAL SUBJECTS OF LAW
(Anne Bottomley et al. eds., 1996).
^2 THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 258 (5th

SL^On this theme, see JOHN FAVOUR, ANTIQUHY TRIUMPHING OVER NOVELTY
(London, Richard Field 1619).
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Cardozo, Benjamin (car-doza) [Author and Judge, 1830-1938]
From the Latin carduus meaning thistle. Alternately from cardinis
(genetive cardo) meaning door hinge. Benjamin from the Hebrew
Binyamin meaning son of the south or of the right hand.
Connotations of strength and of being the favorite. Rhetorical
figure paradigma or resemblance by example. Destined to be a
pivotal figure in law, a favorite or at least an exemplar.
Preordained also that he will play an ambivalent role, that he will
prick or needle, and so occupy a Janus like position in the
development of the law. Author of The Judicial Process and of
numerous pivotal judgments. Frequently relied upon intuition and
upon what he termed "subconscious" elements of law that he
would excavate and use. An agreement could be "instinct with an
obligation"; the "the half truths of one generation [become] the
whole truth of another."^'' Despite or perhaps because of his
frequent recourse to intuition and the unconscious, he once wrote
that "happiness is not my business.'"^ Cardozo tends to be
pronounced "cardoza," literally meaning "by opinion or more
strongly "by sleep" and hence suggests a propensity to "wing it" or
to follow the unconscious. As the etymology of the name also
suggests, such a propensity is as much a gift or endowment {das) or
honor (Medieval Latin doxa) as it is a surprise and potentially a
weakness. Hence his pivotal role, that of the door or hinge
through which new forms are glimpsed. In the second part of the
twentieth century a Law School was named after him, suggesting
by a reverse etymology that he was likely to be a teacher and
author as well as a judge.
Collins, Hugh (Call-ins) [London School of Economics] From the
Latin colonia meaning to colonize, or from the Gaelic uilan
meaning nook or recess. Phonetically close to the French collines.
Wood V. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917). Justice Cardozo
observed that "[a] promise may be lacking, and yet the whole writing may be 'instinct with
obligation.'" Id. In Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 159 N.E. 173
(N.Y. 1927), Cardozo stated that "[vjery likely, conceptions of public policy have shaped,
more or less subconsciously, the rulings thus made." Id. at 175. In more substantive
terms, in the same case, Cardozo puts forward a theory of the unconscious process: "The
half truths of one generation tend at times to perpetuate themselves in the law as the
whole truth of another, when constant repetition brings it about that qualifications, taken
once for granted, are disregarded or forgotten." Id. at 174.
55 Letter from Benjamin N. Cardozo to Elvira Solis (Feb. 15, 1933), quoted in Martin
Seligman et al., Why Lawyers are Unhappy, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 33 (2001). Cardozo
states: "As to being happy, I fear that happiness isn't my line. Perhaps the happy days that
Roosevelt promises will come to me along with others, but I fear that all trouble is in the
disposition that was given to me at birth, and so far as I know, there is no necromancy in
an act of Congress that can work a revolution there." Id. It hardly bears comment that
Cardozo's morbid missive is directed towards someone called "solis," namely alone.
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or hills. Hugh from hug meaning mind, heart, spirit. Rhetorical
figure prolepsis, the passager or explainer. Destined to be a
mental or psychic traveler and specifically to colonize ideas and
subject areas in serial form. As a colonizer, preordained to pass
through a diversity of contexts and conversations but to retain a
recess or nook of origin and Englishness. In light of the phonetic
proximity to hills, Collins is also likely to offer surveys or vistas,
panoramic overviews of doctrines and disciplines. Started off
writing on Marxism and Law, also wrote on the work of his
teacher Roberto Unger; in doctrinal terms wrote on the theory of
Contracts, Employment Law, and regulation.^'' Prolific and diverse
output. A colonizer of the intellect, but also a contrary, an inward
looking extrovert, a shy radical.
Clinton, William Jefferson (Clin-tun) [Disbarred attorney and
former U.S. President] From the Old English glinde meaning
fence, and tun meaning enclosure. William from the Old English
wil meaning desire and helm meaning helmet or protection.
Jefferson from gala, to sing, but also linked to the former president
Jefferson.
Rhetorical figure epizeuxis, the underlay or for
Puttenham the cuckowspell, meaning the repetition of a single
note. As Peacham puts it: "we are likely to use epizeuxis in
moments of stress for lack of a quick synonym." Curious instance
of a contrary, indeed of twice if not thrice contrary. In biblical
terms a thing said thrice becomes its opposite (a lie) and here the
etymology of William Jefferson Clinton would appear to be a
compilation of contraries. Clinton means desire protected, lust
fenced in, a song from within a cage or dovecote or some other
safe space. Thus the etymology suggests someone cautious,
reigned in, and above all appropriate or morally pigeon holed.
Clinton was of course a champion of desire but neither the
grounds of experience nor the protections of office could spare
him the public exposure of his desires. He was fated to act out the
contrary of his name.
Coke, Sir Edward (Cook) [Lord Chief Justice of England, 15521634]'From the Latin coquus, an occupational name for a cook, a
seller of cooked meats, or a keeper of an eating house. Sometimes
confused with Cock, meaning one who struts proudly. Edward
5'' HUGH COLLINS, MARXISM AND LAW (1982); HUGH COLLINS, THE LAW OF
CONTRACT (1986); Hugh Collins, Roberto Unger and the Critical Legal Studies Movement,
14 J L & Soc'Y 387 (1987); HUGH COLLINS, JUSTICE IN DISMISSAL: THE LAW OF
TERMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1992); HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS
(1999).
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from the Old English Eadward, composed of ead meaning fortune
and weard meaning guard.
Rhetorical figure catachresis,
misapplication or the abuser. It should be noted that catachresis
referValso to "necessary metaphor," as in the "tongue of a shoe,
the "foot" of a hill. According to Du Marsais, it marks the
founding role of rhetoric, by tracking changes in the ineanmg or
use of words.'' A doubly English name which fated its bearer not
simply to protecting but to inventing and guarding the often
fictional fortunes of common law as English law. Author of the
Institutes, in two Parts, the first subtitled Or a Commentary of
Littleton, not the name of a lawyer only, but of the law itself. Hi
mythologization of Littleton suffuses the Institutes, which indeed
begins by declaring Littleton not simply the name of the law, but
also by insisting that common lawyers owe to Littleton s Tenures
what the civilians owe to Justinian. The Second Part of the
Institutes addresses another mythical icon of common law, the
Magna Charta, which he describes m the preface, m Latin but
without any apparent irony, as magnae chartae hbertatum Angliae,
the great grant of the liberties of the English, and says it is equally
named communis libertas, and le chartre des franchises, despiQ
being little more than a deal struck between the King, the Church
and the nobilitv.'" Coke continues to assert that the best
inheritance a subject has is the law of the realm."" Elsewhere he
states with apparent sincerity that the common law was of such
antiquity as to be traceable to Brutus the first King of England and
goes on to expatiate upon the "greater antiquity" of common law
"than any the constitutions or laws imperial of Roman
Emperors.""' Later in the Reports, it is King Arthur who signals
the antiquity of common law." Preordained to be the great
eulogist of English law. Coke viewed common law as being so
antique and mystical in power that historians could not refute i
nor sovereigns reform it by legislation. Shares his name with
America's most popular soda. Coke, "the real thing. In the case
of the drink, the slogan is a contrary—Coke no longer contains
M Du MARSAIS, DES TROPES, OU DES DIFFERENS SENS DANS LEQUELS ON PEUT
PRENDRE UN MEME MOT DANS UNE MEME LANGUE (Paris, Chez J. Carez et Thomine
1775) (1730), treats catachresis as the primary figure because all rhetorical figures change
meanings or place words in borrowed homes.
:

THE SECOHO PAET OE THE INSTATES OE THE LAWS OE

ENGLAND (1681) proeme.
^ ^EDWARD COKE, REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD COKE Part 111, at B 3 b (George

TCOKE, REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD COOK Part IX, at C 2 a (George

EDWAR

Wilson trans., 1777).
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cocaine—but in the case of Sir Edward, he remains the real thing,
the authentic mystic or paradoxical chef of the native common law.
Conaghan, Joanne (Kona-han) [Kent Law School, England] From
Old Irish diminutive for chief or leader. Also refers historically to
a Scottish family that rose in status from vassal to owner of the
manor. Joanne from the Hebrew Yochanan meaning "God is
gracious." Rhetorical figure antitheton, that of the contrary
argument or polemicist (as in Joanna ad oppositum). Fated to be a
leader, to rise in status, and to do so in good grace even if m hard
times. Author of numerous articles on labor and employment law
from leftist and feminist perspectives and a theorist of feminist
legal studies." Editor in Chief of the influential journal Feminist
Legal Studies. Recently promoted to a full Professorship in Law
which, as Robert Louis Stevenson once remarked, is a sign of rare
achievement and distinction. In sum, she has risen in status,
remained true to her roots, and become a leader within feminist
legal studies.
Cornell, Drucilla (Kaw-nell) [Rutgers University] From the
French Corneille, probably derived from cornu or horn and hence
prattling person. Drucilla from the Saxon drog meaning ghost or
phantom, and the Old English dm meaning favorite or lover and
hence vigorous, lively, and strong. Rhetorical figure energeia
(sometimes hypotyposis) or lively speech. Fated to be forceful,
loud, and prolific in argument yet also prone, like a spirh or spirits,
to appear and disappear. Preordained to significant intellectual
stature, to radical insight as well as to drama, one might even say
to kernel and comedy. Path-breaking scholar and author of
several important and widely read works on feminist legal theory
including Beyond Accommodation, and The Imaginary Domain.
One of the first feminists to join a Joycean sense of language and
literature to the analysis of the legal form. Also remarkable for
paying legal attention to desire and to imagination. A dominant
figure and leader within her field. Shares her surname with the

« Joanne Conaghan & Louisa Chudleigh, Women in Confinement: Can Labour Law
Deliver the Goods?, 14 J.L. & SOC'Y 133 (1987); Joanne Conaghan, Wishful Thinking or
Bad Faith: A Feminist Encounter with Duncan Kennedy's Critique of Adjudication, 21
::ARDOZO L. REV. 721 (2001); Joanne Conaghan, Reassessing the Feminist Theoretical
Project in Law, 27 J.L. & SOC'Y 351 (2000).
M DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION: ETHICAL FEMINISM,
DECONSTRUCTION, AND THE LAW (1990); DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
FHE LIMIT (1992); DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE IMAGINARY DOMAIN: ABORTION,
PORNOGRAPHY & SEXUAL HARASSMENT (1995); Drucilla Cornell, What Takes Place in
the Dark 4 DIFFERENCES: J. FEMINIST CULTURAL STUD. 45 (1992).
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French baroque dramatist Pierre Corneille and hence a tendency
to drama and specifically to tragedy.
Douzinas, Costas (Doo-see-nas) [University of London, Birkbeck
La\v School] Douzinas from the Latin dulcis (Old French dolz), in
the medieval era often a feminine name. Costas, an abbreviation
of Constantino, from the Latin constans meaning invariable.
Linked historically to the Emperor Constantino, the first Christian
ruler of the Roman Empire in whose honor Byzantium was
renamed Constantinople. Rhetorical figure hyperbole (Latin
dementiens) or excess, though sometimes and more specifically
termed bomphibologia or pompous speech. Fated by etymology
and name to constancy of political purpose as well as to uniformity
of character and uniformly grandiose aspirations. Preordained an
empire builder and seeker after power for ideological reasons.
Like Constantine whose nomination he carries, his political
projects are both massive and fantasmatic. Thus as inclined to
literature and fiction as to law properly speaking.®'
Characteristically co-author of the first work on Postmodern
Jurisprudence in which legal thought from "the classical polls to
the postmodern megapolis" is recast and a new discipline of legal
theory announced.®® His only sole authored work expands the
claim to postmodern empire and declares both the "triumph of
human rights on the world stage" and the "end of human rights."®^
As the ambivalence of the etymological gender of names derived
from dulcis suggests, destined to an ambiguous relation to
feminism, queer theory and gender studies.®® Tendency also by
nomination to sweetness of tooth meaning hedonism and alcohol.
Mainly, however, a pyrrhic universalist. His most comprehensive
position statement on human rights advocates a universal right for
"the other." Not clear what this means save that it offers a highly
abstract universal—"the other"—as the principle or payoff of
human rights. In practice the subject saved or protected by such
rights remains an evanescent or bombastic universal, a projection
or pontification rather than a person.

A maverick in this sense, see the wonderful final chapter to COSTAS DOUZINAS ET
AL., POSTMODERN JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW OF TEXT IN THE TEXTS OF LAW (1991),
where a desire for literature and for fame overtakes the juristic text in a beautifully
satirical ending to the book.
^ Id. at 3.

" COSTAS DOUZINAS, THE END OF HUMAN RIGHTS: CRITICAL LEGAL THOUGHT
AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY (2000).
® Costas Douzinas, The End(s) of Human Rights, 26 MELB. U. L. REV. (forthcoming

2003).
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Dworkin, Ronald (Dee-war-king) [NYU, and University College,
London] Etymologically from Dvorin, from the Hebrew Devorah
meaning prophetess and judge.
Ronald, from Reynold, a
Germanic first name composed of ragin meaning counsel and wald
meaning rule.
The figure of interpretation is epizeuxis or
repetition for emphasis. The interpretation is that Dworkin, who
is one of the most prolifically published jurists in the United
States, and author, amongst numerous other books and articles, of
Law's Empire is both continuously working and endlessly offering
counsel and rule.®' Dworkin, whose theory of law depends upon
the notion of moral principles underpinning and legitimating the
seeming idiosyncrasy or arbitrariness of legal judgments, is both a
reformer and a prophet of law's future. The name destined
Dworkin to law and specifically to the governance of law, to legal
philosophy or expatiation upon the law of laws. Not yet, and
unlikely to be appointed to the Bench, Dworkin is a judge not of
cases but of the merits of laws and in this sense he is properly a
prophet or seer, a visionary of law. He shares his forename with
Ronald Reagan, thespian and politician and so is fittingly
described as both dramatist and judge, hedonist and reformer,
populist and artist who argues prophetically in his book Life's
Dominion, that both life and death should be creative acts.™
Duxbury, Neil (Ducks-berry) [University of Manchester, England]
A place name of uncertain etymology. In literary geography most
notably a reference to the Castle of Dux where the exiled
Giacomo Casanova, Chevalier de Seignalt, wrote his memoirs in
the face of the indignities of ill-treatment from the Duke's servants
and as "the only remedy to keep from going mad or dying of
grief."" Neil from the Old Irish Niall meaning champion,
alternately or latterly from the Latin nihil, meaning nothing, as in
nihilist. Rhetorical figure topothesia or description of imagined
places. Named after a place, the subject is likely to be bounded or
tied to a place and to be cautious of divergence or difference.
Preordained to be a champion without a cause, a successful nihilist
and thus ideally suited for scholarship, for archives and law and
economics. Author of Patterns of American Jurisprudence, a prize
winning work that reconstructs the arcana of faculty disputes and
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986). For a cognate interpretation of the
work, see Allan C. Hutchinson, Indiana Dworkin and Law's Empire, 96 YALE L.J. 637
(1987).
RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993).
" GIACOMO CASANOVA, HISTORY OF MY LIFE I, at 9 (Willard R. Trask trans., 1966)
(1960).
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committee meetings within twentieth century US law schools.'^
Also author of a short work on Jurists and Judges which
interestingly studies the unseen and mainly imagined influence of
the former upon the latter." Has spent almost his entire career at
the University of Manchester, a provincial and sometimes troubled
English Law School.
Fischl, Michael ([ojfficial) [Miami Law School] From the Hebrew
fisch, meaning fish and referring latterly to one who spreads or
disseminates to many. In the Book of Jonah the great fish was a
mode of transport and transmission. Michael from Hebrew
Micha-el meaning "who is like God." In Biblical terms the
archangel Michael was the conqueror of Satan, and so a warrior
for the good.
Rhetorical figure paramologia or figure of
admission, a figure that marks the persuasive orator who admits
the arguments of the opponent before they are made and then uses
such admission to advantage. Destined to rhetorical success,
partieularly as a teacher and disseminator of ethics in law. A
leading critical legal scholar preordained to subtle political and
rhetorical modes of advocacy. Most famously author of ''The
Question that Killed Critical Legal Studies," an archetypically
paramological piece, which by exaggerating reports of the death of
the movement, helped breathe new life into it.^" A brilliant and
gracious host of many critical legal symposia dedicated to honoring
the work of prominent critical scholars as well as, more
occasionally, to admitting their weaknesses."
Fraunce, Abraham (Frawn—ss) [Philosopher, Poet, and Lawyer,
1587-1633] From the Latin Franciscus meaning French man.
Abraham from the Hebrew av hamon goyim or father of a
multitude of nations. Rhetorical figure antistrophe or turning
away from one sort of speech to another. Destined by name to be
a reformer of law or founder of new schools of legal thought.
Preordained to introduce French theory into English law, which is
precisely what he did in The Lawiers Logike. Trained at
Cambridge University in philosophy and specifically in the
reformist philosophy of Ramism that was then sweeping Europe,
Fraunce's work subjected common law to the precepts of the
'2 NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995).
" NEIL DUXBURY, JURISTS AND JUDGES: AN ESSAY ON INFLUENCE (2001).
2" Michael Fischl, The Question That Killed Critical Legal Studies, 17 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 779 (1992).
" His symposium on the work of Duncan Kennedy was published in the Cardozo Law
Review, 2001. 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 773 (2001). His symposium on the work of Pierre
Schlag will appear in 57 MIAMI L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).
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topical French scholasticism of Petrus Ramus. Fraunce is indeed
now pronounced France. Abraham, however, is a contrary.
Fraunce may have prefigured the interdisciplinary study of law
that took hold in the twentieth century, roughly three centuries
after his death, but his book and influence were rapidly forgotten.
Frank, Jerome (Frang-ck) [Judge, Jurist and Reformer, 1889-1957]
From the Norman Franc meaning javelin and also referring to
Franconia, a region in Germany settled by the Franks. Jerome
from the Greek hieronymos meaning sacred name. In the
Germanic, from geri meaning spear and hraban meaning raven.
Rhetorical figure dialisis or the dismemberer. Fated to the role of
rebel and iconoclast—throwing javelins at sacred names.
Preordained to dismember the sanctities of law. Author of Law
and the Modern Mind a classic realist study of the myths of law
which made copious use of Freudian theory. In that and numerous
other writings Frank dismembered the normative apparatus of law
in favor of a view of facts determining outcomes. Fact-skepticism
argued that the uncertainties of fact determination make law
unpredictable and thence that social science rather than normative
jurisprudence was the best avenue to understanding law.
Nominally destined to be subject to French and German
influences—to continental thought—and to be direct in his
mysticism. Frank by name and by nature.
Gabel, Peter (Gay-bull) [New College] Various etymologies
including German gabel meaning fork and hence someone who
lives near a fork in a road or river; from Germanic gable meaning
tax, and hence tax collector; and finally from Slavic jablo meaning
apple tree. Phonetically close to gab and gabbler, meaning
talkative or loquacious. Peter meaning rock. Rhetorical figure
asphalia (also sometimes certitude or securitas) the figure of
personal guarantee. Fated to choose the harder road when faced
with a fork in the path of his career. Preordained to intellectual
authenticity, to knowledge of intimacy and friendship, and to
personal guarantees of his conversation. One of the founders of
the critical legal studies movement in the United States, he left a
secure job and high status prospects at University of Minnesota
School of Law to go to New College, San Francisco to found an
alternative law school. Co-author, with Duncan Kennedy, of a
famous critical legal dialogue, ''Roll Over Beethoven."''^ Author of
numerous articles on the psychology and specifically the existential
Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984).
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deficits of lawyers and lawyering.^^ Now writes more for the
(intellectual) popular cultural journal Tikkun than for law reviews
or other non-dialogic or more simply unread academic forms.
Gains (Guy-ous) [Jurist and Teacher circa C.E. 110-180] From the
Hebrew gai meaning valley. Old French gui meaning guide or
rope that guides. In Medieval Latin sometimes gaiola meaning
gaol or prison.
Occupational name for one who guides.
Rhetorical figure simploce, meaning repetition, interweaving, or
reply. The same word, face, visage, countenance, feature, appears
again and again. Destined to be the constant guide of law and
lawyers. Preordained to become a common noun, a sign of the
original contract or constitution of the legal. An unending source
or storehouse of knowledge and principles of law. Author of the
Institutes, a book for first year law students composed in the
second century of the Christian Era. He became, for lawyers,
Gaius noster (our Gaius) and in later Latin, Gauls and Gala
became the generic names for bridegroom and bride at marriage
festivals. Two millennia after its composition, the Institutes is still
in print and studied.™ A guide indeed.
Gearey, Adam (Gyr-ri) [University of London, Birkbeck College]
From Gaelic gadhar meaning hound or mastiff, and latterly from
the German gari meaning spear. In English a nickname for
someone changeable, both passionate and fickle. Adam from
adama meaning earth, and biblically from Adam the first man.
Rhetorical figure charientismus or figure of mitigation, of saying
disagreeable things with agreeable style. Destined to swiftness of
thought and action, to leading the pack or being at the forefront of
his peers. Preordained to play a leading role in interdisciplinary
legal studies. Gearey is in part a contrary in that far from being
fickle the mastiff or hound connotes loyalty, persistence and
perhaps passionate attachment to causes. Nominally both a critic
and an organizer or spearhead of his group. A critical legal scholar
who has been remarkably original and pleasingly erudite in his
critical choices of thesis. He writes on Joyce, on Christian
conceptions of love, and authored the first book length study of
the aesthetics of law.™ The acceptable face of legal critique.

'''' Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the
Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1563 (1984); Peter Gabel, Alienation v. Community,
TIKKUN, July/Aug. 2001, at 33.
™ GAIUS, INSTITUTES (Francis De Zulueta trans., 1956).
" ADAM GEAREY, LAW AND AESTHETICS (John Gardner ed., 2001).
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Harrington, Christine (Hair-ing-tun) [New York University] From
the Old English haer meaning heath and referring to "settlement
on stony ground." Alternate root is Gaelic arrachtach meaning
mighty, powerful. Christine from the Latin Christianus or follower
of Christ. Rhetorical figure antipophora or figure of response:
"and is when we will seeme to aske a question to th'intent we will
aunswere it ourselves, and is a figure of argument and also of
amplification.'"*' Christ, of course, is the paradoxical figure of the
martyr, and in Christian terms of the short-term failure that
constitutes long-term success. Thus fated to establishing powerful
positions in hostile environments, and destined to settle or build
institutionally upon stony ground. Trained in politics, and author
appropriately enough of a thesis on shadows, she became a leader
in the Law and Society Association and movement.^' Long-term
member of the Amherst law and society seminar. She founded the
Institute for Law and Society at New York University. A powerful
achievement and tribute to her considerable capacity for
argument, amplification, and martyrdom. A cross-disciplinary
institute, her program exists uneasily between politics and law.
Over many years it has failed to gain the institutional recognition
or support that it deserves. A settlement on stony or simply
legalistic ground.
Hotman, Francois (Ot-maan) [Sixteenth-century French jurist]
French translation of the Latin vir caldus or hot man, meaning
man of choleric temperament and polemical disposition. Francois,
meaning "free man" and latterly French. Rhetorical figure
antirrhesis or denunciation. Destined to be heated or excitable in
character and distinctively French. Author of Franco-Gallia, an
account of the customs and laws of France and also of a highly
erudite tirade against the teaching of Roman law in Renaissance
Europe, titled Anti-Tribonian.^^ By name and nature a peculiarly
Gallic, which is to say stylish, polemicist.
Jacobson, Arthur (Jakob-sun) [Cardozo School of Law] Son of
Jacob, the latter from the Hebrew Yaakov meaning heel. The
PUTTENHAM, supra note 36, at 204. Henry Peacham cites Cicero: "I grant there is in
it great labors, and many perils, yet by painful travail and valiant adventures therein shall
ensue immortal glory." PEACHAM, supra note 36, at 71.

M CHRISTINE B. HARRINGTON, SHADOW JUSTICE: THE IDEOLOGY AND
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO COURT (1985).
82 FRANCOISE HOTMAN, FRANCO-GALLI A OR, AN ACCOUNT OF THE ANCIENT FREE
STATE OF FRANCE (London, Goodwin 1711); FRANCOISE HOTMAN, ANTITRIBONIAN OU
DISCOURS D'UN GRAND ET RENOMME 144-45 (Paris, Perrier 1603) (1567) [hereinafter
HOTMAN, ANTITRIBONIAN],
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biblical Jacob was the twin of Essau and went on to fight for Israel.
Arthur, Celtic, from follower of Thor, the Norse God of war.
Rhetorical figure procatalepsis or anticipation. Destined to be a
smooth man, a bald man, just as Esau was a hairy man, or simply
hirsute. Preordained to write and fight for Jewish causes, while by
virtue of his forename that war must be staged in the mind, at the
level of image and imagination rather than blood and killing.
Author most prominently of "The Idolatry of Rules: Writing Law
According to Moses, with Reference to Other Jurisprudences,'' part
of a symposium on the work of the Jewish French philosopher and
proponent of deconstruction, Jacques Derrida.^^ Shares his
forename with the legendary King Arthur of the Round Table.
Likely, therefore, to invent imaginary schemes, to envision
Camelot, and to attend to the Utopian.
Justinian (Yoost-inyan) [Emperor and Codifier, c 483-565] From
the Latin jus law, and justus meaning right and thence justice.
Rhetorical figure merismus or the distributor. Destined to a
leading role in law and in the preservation of justice. With the aid
of Tribonian carried out a comprehensive codification of Roman
law (528-534), the Digest, and also promulgated his own laws, the
Novels, and wrote a key textbook or introduction to law, the
Institutes. One or two manuscripts survived and were rediseovered
in the eleventh century. These formed the basis of European legal
education. Nominally destined to define law as justice and indeed
begins the Institutes by defining jurisprudence as a knowledge of
things divine and human.®^ In similar style, the forward to the
Digest cites God as its author and states subsequently in a more
distributive mode that law is the art of the good and the equal.®'
Kennedy, Duncan (Ken-aidy) [Harvard Law School] From the
Gaelic ceann meaning head and eidigh armored, so meaning
helmeted head. Ironically, first recorded in a Scottish family
claiming descent from the Earl of Duncan (c. 1228). Duncan from
the Gaelic donn meaning dark or brown and ceann meaning head.
Thus two headed, perhaps Janus faced.
Rhetorical figure
allegoria, meaning extended metaphor, or figure of fair semblance.
It is described by Puttenham as the courtly figure par excellence,
most commonly used by politicians, as in ''[q\ui nescit dissimulare
® See DECONSTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE (Drucilla Cornell at al.
eds., 1992). This text is a partial republication of volume eleven of the Cardozo Law
Review.
^ JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES 1.1.1 p. 37 col. 1.
85 JUSTINIAN, DIGEST. 1.1.1. p. 1.
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nescit regnare," ("he who knows how to dissemble knows how to
rule.")'*^ Twice named after the head, destined to be a brilliant
intellectual, one with the equivalent of two brains, scintillating,
with two tongues and so fated to be improbably loquacious.
Vulnerable by virtue of exposure, Kennedy is cautious of
friendship and remains frequently helmeted or protected. Author
of many radical and iconoclastic texts, prime amongst which is
Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy and much later A
Critique of Adjudication.^ The former text denounced legal
education as a charade for the inculcation of political
conservatism; the latter denounced the judiciary as a charade for
the promulgation of political conservatism. Has been true to his
nominal fate and has frequently needed his helmet. Shares his
name with the Kennedy clan, including former president J.F.
Kennedy. Political through and through.
Leiter, Brian (Light-er) [University of Texas School of Law] From
the Old English laedan, to lead and also sometimes used to refer to
someone who led sport or dance. Also frequently an occupational
name for someone who worked with lead. An alternate etymology
from the German leite meaning hill or slope. Brian from the Celtic
bre meaning hill and latterly connoting eminence. Rhetorical
figure tapinosis or the abaser. Twice named after a hill and so
doubly likely to be eminent or at least to dance or sport in a
prominent and visible position. As his name suggests phonetically,
that dance or sport will likely be light and so in polemical terms
humorous. The mixture of lightness and lead suggests a contrary,
perhaps the humor of the lead balloon. Serious scholar of
Nietzsche and the German philosophical tradition but also a
humorous polemicist and proponent of the lighter side of law.
Thus, for example, writing in The Green Bag on the paucity of
philosophy in law schools, Leiter offers the apparently empirical
opinion that "more than half of what appears in top law reviews
purporting to deal with philosophy or philosophical topics is
sophomoric, the kind of writing that would prevent an

PUTTENHAM, supra note 36, at 186 (author's translation).

DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF
HIERARCHY; A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM (1983). My thanks to Duncan for
supplying me with a copy of this rare and elegant text; see also DUNCAN KENNEDY, A
CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIFCLE (1997). I must confess disconsolately that I
too have been guilty of testing Kennedy's protection or state of helmetedness, as in Peter
Goodrich, Duncan Kennedy as I Imagine Him: The Man, The Work, His Scholarship, And
The Polity, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 971 (2001), and further in Peter Goodrich, Laws of
Friendship, 15 LAW & LITERATURE (forthcoming 2003).
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undergraduate from getting into a PhD program."®® The footnote
proof of this point consists simply of a reference to two articles,
one by James Boyle, the other by Pierre Schlag, both highly
successful law professors specializing in legal theory but not
sharing Leiter's predilection for analytic method. Interestingly, in
this jape Brian omits the third name in the group. Jack Balkin
whom he used to link to and equate with Schlag and his
sophomoric ilk.®' Balkin had at this point moved to Yale Law
School and for some inexplicable reason now escapes Leiter's light
touch. The humor lies in the highly polemical or simply political
character of a philosophical judgment that is in terms of analytic
method supposed to be neutral. Whereas the cliche runs "many a
true word said in jest," Leiter perhaps offers an illustration of the
inverse proposition: "many an erroneous statement comes wearing
the mask of seriousness."
Littleton, Sir Thomas [Judge and writer. Member of Inner Temple,
1415-1481] From Old English lytel meaning small and tun meaning
enclosure, settlement or holding. Thomas a biblical name implying
doubt. Rhetorical figure synecdoche or part for whole. Destined
to detail or particularity, to the small things and small holdings, to
the inside of enclosures, to the insular. Dubious of the unenclosed
and of the continental. Author of Tenures, a three volume work
on English property law and custom, the first volume dealing with
estates, the second with tenures, and the third with co-ownership.
It was probably the most successful English law book ever written,
enjoying roughly ninety editions. Whatever its innate merits,
Littleton's Tenures became a load stone of common law
imperialism and lies at the roots of the insularity and sclerosis of
the early modern instauration of an Anglican common law.
Thomas or doubter would seem in this case to be a contrary.
Littleton was famous for the clarity and certainty of his prose.
Llewellyn, Karl (Th-lew-ellen) [Jurist and Commercial lawyer,
1893-1962] From the Old Welsh llyw meaning leader. Karl from
the Latin Carolus, meaning man, with connotations of strength and
majesty drawn from the lauded French emperor Charlemagne
{Carolus Magnus). Rhetorical figure paradiastole or putting
together of dissimilar things. Destined to strange combinations
leading to brilliant, even noble, novelties and some obscurities. A
leader of the American legal realist movement and author of
Brian Leiter, The Law School Observer, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 101 (2001).
Brian Leiter, Objectivity and the Problems of Jurisprudence, 72 TEX, L. REV. 187,
n.4 (1993) (book review).
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several books on common law method and the limited use of
studying appellate court rules.'" Rule skepticism, however, did not
mitigate against Llewellyn also writing orthodox and influential
works in commercial law and contributing signally to the draft
Uniform Commercial Code.
Lysyk, Stephanie (Lie-sick) [Maitresse en droit Canadienne]
From the Polish lis meaning fox and thence cunning person.
Alternately from Gaelic lasachta meaning strange or foreign.
Phonetically close to lit, the French for bed, and to lire as in to
read, and thus proximate to the bed of justice. Stephanie from the
Greek Stephanos meaning crown.
Etymology shared with
Lysenko. Rhetorical figure expeditio or the speedy dispatcher.
Destined to be a crowning or royal juristic figure though also
strange, attracted to the foreign, and an erudite lover of dissimilar
things. A doctor of literature who specializes in Rabelais and then
trains in law. An erudite lawyer who writes on the comic drama of
justice. Author of Making a Farce out of Justice, a sparkling
account of the Basoche, an organization of fifteenth century
Parisian law clerks who authored and performed satirical mock
trials. Francophile and Latinate, she is what the Renaissance
would have termed an illustrious or erudite woman, a femme forte,
a satirist and strangely brilliant thinker. She is a peculiarly thorny
critic and an extraordinarily generous correspondent. Author of
the main title of this essay.
MacCormick, Sir Neil (Mack-caw-mick) [University of Edinburgh;
Member of the European Parliament] From the Gaelic corb
meaning raven and mac meaning son. Neil from the Irish Niall,
meaning champion, and mediately from niger meaning dark.
Rhetorical figure periphrasis or circumlocution. Fated to be the
son of someone seemingly greater. Preordained to work within a
tradition of scholarship and nimbly to develop or extricate good
arguments for poor causes. Son of the Chancellor of Glasgow
University, who was also a famous Scottish litigant, the plaintiff in
MacCormick v The Lord Advocate Preordained to be an elegant
systematizer. Sir Neil devoted much of his academic career to
embellishing the work of the English academic jurist H.L.A.
Hart.®^ His own noted and yet scarcely original contribution to
'O K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (1960);
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1962);
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960).
MacCormick v. The Lord Advocate, 1953 Sess. Cas. 396 (1953).
" NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY (1978); NEIL
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jurisprudence was the theory of law as an institutional fact. As the
nominal allusions to the raven and to darkness also indicate, a
certain dark side which drew a Scottish nationalist to write in
eulogy of the most English of jurisprudences and led to the
effervescent adoption of an equally Anglican view of law as
establishment or mere institutional fact. Another instance of a
politician operating under the analytic guise of neutrality. After a
career paradoxically devoted to the most English of legal theories
and yet also to failed attempts to be elected as a Scottish
Nationalist Member of the British Parliament, Sir Neil eventually
became a Member of the European Parliament. Anecdotally said
to have commented of his new role that the frequency of travel
between Brussels and Strasbourg, the two sites of the European
Parliament, means that he has to keep a set of suits in each place.
Hence versatile.
What he achieves sartorially he exceeds
academically.
Manderson, Desmond (Mand-a-son) [McGill University,
Montreal] Of uncertain origin. It may be from the Latin
mendicare, to beg, and thence a nickname for a beggar.
Alternately from Middle English maund, basket, and thence
maker of baskets. Finally, possibly from Latin, commandare, to
command, and thence someone in a position of authority.
Desmond from the French monde (from which mondaine, or
worldly) meaning world or society. Rhetorical figure paroemia or
proverb. Destined to travel between countries and disciplines.
Started out as a concert pianist and then trained in law. Fated to a
leading role in interdisciplinary legal studies and to academic
globetrotting; moving from McGill in Canada to Sydney,
Australia, and then back to Canada. Author of a sociology of drug
regulations and also of Songs Without Music, a study of law and
aesthetics which argues "as in music, so in law.'"^ An aesthete in
law, a dedicated follower of juristic rhythms, a proponent of
method as melody, and of judgment as tone. Full of worldly wiles
and aesthetic mots justes. Also noteworthy that phonetically
Manderson is a double masculine, man and son. Likely thus that
his obsession with the aesthetic, in disciplinary terms with the
feminine, betrays a contrary, a fear of femininity both outside and
within.
Mazor, Lester (May-soar) [Hampshire College] From the Polish
MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART (1981).
^ ^
'3 DESMOND MANDERSON, SONGS WITHOUT MUSIC: AESTHETIC DIMENSIONS OF
LAW AND JUSTICE (2000).

1340

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:3

place name Masuria. Alternately from the Spanish mazo meaning
mallet. Cognate with macho and the Latin masculus meaning man
and manly. Lester from the Hebrew Lazar meaning may God
help him. Alternately from the Old English meaning camp or
protected place. Rhetorical figure hyperbaton or the trespasser
Destined to forceful thought or to what Nietzsche termed
philosophizing with a hammer. As his forename suggests, thinking
with a mallet is not academically popular and so has needed
protection, institutional encampments, and the aid of God, on
numerous occasions. Began his career as a law professor at
Stanford University. Was refused tenure, perhaps in part for being
Jewish. Moved to University of Utah and Marxism. From there
moved to Hampshire College and an anarchistic philosophy of
law.'" Rationalist with a big club.
Mills Linda (Mil-z) [New York University] From the Latin
molere, to grind and alternately from the Old English my/en.
Topographic name for someone who lives near a mill. Mill ana
miller were central features in medieval settlements, and hence the
frequency of the name and the prominence of its bearer who is
now Vice Provost for Interdisciplinary Initiatives and University
Life at NYU. Linda from the Latin libet meaning pleasing and
latterly pretty. Some have suggested that Linda is derived from
the Old German for serpent. Serpent, from the Latin serpc), to
crawl but also to proceed gradually, to attend closely to detail, to
remain well grounded. Rhetorical figure pwsographia, the figure
of portraiture or the inscriber of the face. Born for love and for
love of detail. Thus both a therapist and a lawyer, and married to
a lawyer. The latter attribute is not uncommon: a statistically
disproportionate number of lawyers are married to therapists, and
thus, logically, a lot of therapists marry lawyers. What is
uncommon is for a lawyer to train as a therapist as opposed to
taking the easy—the cynical might say cheaper—route of simply
marrying one. It is this combination that dictates or motivates a
scholarly career marked most of all by unflinching focus upon
detail and extraordinary honesty or candor. Working pnncipaUy
in the field of domestic violence, she is author most recently of a
widely publicized book titled Insult to InjuryP In that work Mills

Lester J. Mazor, Disrespect For Law, in ANARCHISM (J. Roland Pmnock & John
W. Chapman, eds. 1978); Lester J. Mazor, Some Recent Discoveries Concerning the
Mnriern State BLACK ROSE 15 (Summer 1979).

LINDA G. MILLS, INSULT TO INJURY: RETHINKING OUR RESPONSES TO INTIMATE
ABUSE (forthcoming 2003). See also Linda G. Mills, f^ifl^s Her^ftly: Intimate Abuse
and the Violence of State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550 (1999).

2003]

THE OMEN IN NO MEN

1341

argues against the highly legalistic feminist orthodoxy of
mandatory arrest and prosecution, and demands that each woman
be listened to, and that each case be treated uniquely. Proposing
that judgment be both down to earth and tellurian, that the face to
face of justice be taken seriously, she applies a philosophy of love
to the quandary of law. Fate alone could dictate that her
philosophy should apply her first name, love, to her second name,
her practice, work, or law. Between the two names, the Old
German for snake suggests also the sin of Eve, the practice and the
dangers of knowledge. Thus fated to polemical stances whose
unpopularity is in inverse ratio to their truth: the further ahead of
her time that her work is, the more vigorously yet unsuccessfully it
is resisted by the orthodox. An innovator who performs her
paradoxical etymological destiny of giving a face to law.
Moore, Nathan (Maw-ur) [University of Kent, Canterbury] From
the Latin Maurus, meaning Phoenician or Eastern, and with
connotations of both mysticism and bodily wisdom, as in ex oriente
lux—light comes from the East. Phonetically close to mores
meaning customs though properly these would be the inverse of
Western customary norms or common law. Alternate derivation
from the Gaelic Mordha meaning great or proud. Early historical
connection to the Templars, Johannes filius more, 1185. Nathan
from the Hebrew given name Natan meaning gift or given by God
and borne of a minor prophet. Rhetorical figure cronographia
which Peacham defines as "when we do describe any time for
delectations sake,'"® and Puttenham more succinctly depicts as
"the counterfait of time."" Fated to invert the mores of Western
common law with the bodily pleasures or "desiring regimes" of an
essentially Eastern wisdom. Destined to displace the past with the
future, custom with innovation, precedent with prophecy, and
perhaps method with jazz. His first major article offers veiled
references to Marx's Eighteenth Brumaire and the materialist
critique of the overwhelming burden of the past upon the
oppressed.'® With coruscating wit he argues:

PEACHAM, supra note 36, at 66.
PUTTENHAM, supra note 36, at 239.
See Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in KARL MARX &
FREDERICK ENGELS: SELECTED WORKS IN ONE VOLUME 94 (4th prtg. 1977). It is
tempting to observe that materialism is historical: there is no body without its inscriptions,
no face save as a representation, no voice without writing. None of which detracts from
Moore's brilliant esssay, but rather subjects it to a trajectory, and locates it within a
geography and history or tongue duree of theory. What he offers in these admittedly now
distant terms is a loosely Leninist critique of empirico-criticism. Sadly perhaps we should
be wary of ignoring the empirical fate of that critique.

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

1342

[Vol. 24:3

The analysis of law cannot claim to be critical if it only recalls
the bodies upon which law can be shown to have acted. Such
recalling can only fall within a specific realm of logic or thought.
This is problematic as it is not future but past orientated. It
revolves around transmission of the past to such a degree that
the potential of the future is reduced to, or made dependant
upon, the re-appearance of the past in the future.^'
Curiously for a materialist he seeks a future outside of history and
a body outside of inscription and law: a fully conscious, entirely
productive, and wholly incorporated regime of desire. He offers
thus a juristic form of Buddhism via Deleuze and ideally will found
a radical legal cult, perhaps the Outer Temple. Thus destined by
name and enthusiasm to prophecy, and specifically to utopianism
and its attendant atemporalism. Wishing to have done with the
judgment of God his name nonetheless denotes someone who is
ever drawn back to the temple, addicted to the plus ultra or to
something more.
Rawls, John (Raw-als) [Harvard University] From the Old Norse,
composed of rad meaning counsel and wolf meaning wolf. John,
from Yehocanan meaning God is gracious. Name made popular
by St John the Evangelist. Rhetorical figure pragmatographia or
counterfeit action. As illustration, Puttenham cites Lord Nicolas
Vaux's ditty on Cupid which begins: "When Cupid scaled first the
fort, / Wherein my hart lay wounded sore / The battrie was of such
a sort, / That I must yeeld or die therefore."^"" And ends, crudely
enough: "There might you heare the Canons rore, / Each peece
discharging a lovers looke, & etc."^°^ Fated to success but of a
contradictory sort. Preordained to give the counsel of wolves, thus
his most famous contribution in A Theory of Justice consists of
proposing an "original position," locked behind a veil of ignorance
from which wolves—pre-social men—judge what is just.''® The
theory of justice and later concepts such as that of overlapping
consensus have enjoyed enormous success of a normative kind.
Being that these works advocate the merits of American liberalism
and specifically of the status quo, their proposed course of action is
in essence things as normal or proceeding as we are.
Rosenfeld, Michel (Rows-en-felled) [Cardozo School of Law]
From the Ashkenazic, an ornamental surname from royz, the word
^ Nathan Moore, A Distant Hand Fell From His Shoulder, 11 LAW & CRITIQUE 185

(2000).

100 PUTTENHAM, supra note 36, at 240.
Id.

JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971).
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for the flower, and a metonymic from the Yiddish Royze derived
from the word for the flower. Alternate etymology from the
German Rothais, recorded in Domesday Book and apparently
made up of the elements hrod, renown, and haidis, kind. Michel
from the Hebrew Michael, "who is like God." Archangel Michael
was the Prince of Angels and chief divine messenger who carried
out God's judgments. Michel, finally, is the French spelling of
Michael and portends a connection with or interest in France and
the French. Rhetorical figure sinonimia or figure of store or
interpretation. Per Puttenham; "When so ever we multiply our
speech by many words or clauses ... one of them doth expound
another."^® Bearer of an ornamental name, Rosenfeld works in
what is seen, at least juristically, to be the ornamental disciplinary
domain of continental legal theory. He offers kindly or Just
Interpretations}'^ Nominally fated to hermeneutics, Rosenfeld is
further destined to the floral or figural, to the troubled status of a
rhetorician in a discipline that denies its use of schemes and tropes.
In its alternate etymology, Rosenfeld also implies kindly
interpretations or, in the language of the cultural revolution, he
would let a thousand flowers bloom. Michael, by contrast, suggests
advocacy of causes and in Just Interpretations, Rosenfeld does
indeed act as the messenger or kindly advocate of deconstruction.
He argues early in the work that "the deconstructive process
implies an ontology of the unbridgeable separation of self and
other... an ontology of infinite postponement of the
reconciliation of self and other.
He goes on to add, kindly
enough, for those with separation anxiety, or frightened by
postponement, that "this ontology is supplemented by an ethic of
inclusion, and care for the other." Polyglot and prominent, as his
name suggests, Rosenfeld has been a long serving President of the
International Association of Constitutional Law, and is founding
Editor-in-Chief of ICON, its journal.
Sarat, Austin (Sur-rat) [Amherst College] Of uncertain etymology
though phonetically close to "seras," the French future tense of the
verb to be—as in "you will be," or its Spanish equivalent, "que
sera, sera"—-"what will be, will be."
Austin, Old French
diminutive of Augustine, meaning to increase or spread influence.
Biblical reference to the Church Father, Saint Augustine of Hippo,
and in jurisprudential terms to John Austin, author of The
103 PUTTENHAM, supra note 36, at 214.

MICHEL ROSENFELD, JUST INTERPRETATIONS; LAW BETWEEN ETHICS AND
POLITICS (1998).
Id. at 19.
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Province of Jurisprudence Determined}^
Rhetorical figure
apodioxis or the refuter. Destined to be influential, to co-ordinate
academic movements, administer organizations, to edit collections
of work, and to demarcate intellectual territories. Preordained to
address the boundaries of his discipline—to determine its
(disputed) province—and to focus extensively on what will be,
namely death. Editor of innumerable book series in the sociology
and cultural study of law; formerly President of the Law and
Society Association; Founding President of the Law, Culture,
Humanities Association. Author of When the State Kills: Capital
Punishment and the American Condition', editor of The Killing
State: Capital Punishment in Law, Politics, and Culture, as also of
Pain, Death, and the Law, and numerous other works on fate,
meaning and violence."" Clearly a campaigner and formidable
adversary in argument, but as the surname suggests there is also a
tendency to privilege function over purpose, and symmetry over
direction—in the end, one might say, que Sarat, Sarat, and what
will be, will be.
Schlag, Pierre (Sh-lag) [University of Colorado] From the
German schlag meaning cream. Pierre from Petrus meaning rock.
Rhetorical figure prosopopoeia, the figure of impersonation which
attributes human characteristics to animals, things, or ideas.
Destined to pour cream upon rock, criticism upon deaf ears.
Preordained to engage wondrously in syncretic intellectual
exercises, mixing the foreign—the French—with the American, the
anti-normative with the pragmatic. Described for this reason, in
one critical appreciation as "Pierre the Anomalist.""'^ Author of
an efflorescence of articles including ''Normative and Nowhere to
Go," and "The Aesthetics of American Law," as well as of a book
entitled The Enchantment of Reason."^ Each title implies a
paradox that coincides with the antithesis embodied in the name:
an author of fiction writing about law; an artist addressing a
domain without images; a magician seeking to break the spell of
JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (Law Book
Exchange 1999) (1832).

AUSTIN SARAT, WHEN THE STATE KILLS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
AMERICAN CONDITION (2001); THE KILLING STATE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE
LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE (Austin Sarat ed., 1999); PAIN, DEATH, AND THE LAW
(Austin Sarat ed., 2001); THE FATE OF LAW (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds.,
1991); LAW'S VIOLENCE (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1995).
108 Peter Goodrich, Pierre the Anomalist: An Eplstemology of the Legal Closet, 57 U.

MIAMI L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).
PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON (1998); Pierre Schlag, The
Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (2002); Pierre Schlag, Normative
and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167 (1990).
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the logic of law. Fated to fictionalizing or humorously redescribing legal debates: legal doctrine becomes the fiendish plot
of "the Normativo"; legal positivism is depicted as the
jurisprudence of the holding pattern; and Pierre himself shifts from
an early self-presentation as a failed cab driver to a pedagogue, to
the organizer of trans-historical juristic parties. Be that as it may,
and as has been coined by my eponymous colleague Professor
Gudridge of Miami Law School, whatever Pierre writes, and
however recalcitrant or impermeable the subject matter, it is
always written con brio and "mit schlag.'"^"
Schroeder, Jeanne (Shrow-der) [Cardozo Law School] From the
Northern German occupational name for a tailor, from schraten to
cut. Also used for shoemakers and leather cutters. Jeanne a
female form of Yochanan or God is gracious. Rhetorical figure
apostrophe or interruption of discourse, often in a vehement tone.
Fated to academic and legal precision, to cutting, interrupting,
correcting. Preordained successfully to propound a theory of law
that involves significant attention to cuts or cutting. Prominent
interpreter of Lacanian theory in relation to law. Author of The
Vestal and the Fasces, a Hegelian feminist theory of law which
reads Hegel through Lacan and attends significantly to the theory
of castration anxiety as intrinsic to the formation of the juristic self
and as structuring the legal concept of property:
[T]he masculine subject constantly needs to reassure others
(and try to fool himself) that he actually has "it" by identifying
an objet petit a—an imaginary object that stands for a place in
the real. He grasps the phallic substitute for the Phallus in his
hand and wields it shouting, "See, here 'it' is!""^
Schiitz, Anton (Ssh-oots) [London and Paris] From the Old
German skiozan, to shoot. Occupational name for a bowman.
Historical reference to Heinrich Schiitz (1583-1672) a composer
born into a French family that settled in Saxony. Anton from the
Latin Anthonius, of unknown etymology, the name of several
eelebrated Emperors and of a famous orator. Latterly meaning
worthy of praise and dubiously yet significantly from the Greek
anthos or flower. Rhetorical figure erotema or the questioner.
Student of the French philosophers Michel Foucault and Pierre
Legendre, Schiitz is nominally destined to an international and
"0 Patrick Gudridge, Mit Schlag (Repetitions), 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. (forthcoming
2003).
JEANNE LORRAINE SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES: HEGEL, LACAN,
PROPERTY, AND THE FEMININE 218-19 (1998).
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interdisciplinary scholarship that like the craft of the bowman
facilitates trajectories or shoots the arrows of knowledge into
distant and obscure locations. There, as his forename suggests,
erudition can flourish. Fated to combine music with law, the
Francophile with the Teutonic and the Anglo-Saxon, the rhetorical
with the philosophical. Concerned most of all with why we
shoot—with the direction of our epistemic and polemical arrows.
Thus his major article ''Sons of Writ, Sons of Wrath" explores an
unexplored passage from Pauline theology as a guide to legal
thought.
In a further exemplary essay "Desiring Society:
Autopoiesis Beyond the Paradigm of Mastership" he notes that
autopoiesis "means, first of all, the appearance of a new and
unknown population on the blackboard [better, dartboard] of
theory.""' A brilliant teacher, an epistemic Cupid firing darts at
somnolent students.
Sexton, John (Sex-tun) [Late twentieth century Dean of NYU Law
School, latterly President of NYU] Occupational name for a
sexton or churchwarden, the officer in charge of sacred vessels and
vestments, from the Latin sacristanus. Alternate etymology from
the Irish seasuighim, to resist or defend. John from Yochanan
meaning favored by God. Rhetorical figure anacoenosis, that of
communication and specifically of consultation with adversaries
and deliberation with judges. Fated to be a brilliant steward, an
advocate of his community or school and a proponent of morality
in the uses of law."' Appointed Dean of New York University
Law School, a mid-ranking local law school in the late 1980s.
Through brilliant fundraising and through generous intellectual
vision transformed the School into a national center of excellence
and of interdisciplinary innovation within the US legal academy.
Now a top-ranked law school. Sexton has made the obvious move
and become President of New York University, which is to say he
"2 Anton Schutz, Sons of Writ, Sons of Wrath: Pierre Legendre's Critique of Rational
Law-Giving, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 979, 979 n.l (1995) (discussing Ephesians 2:3:
"[E]ranius natura filii irae"); Anton Schutz, Desiring Society: Autopoiesis Beyond the
Paradigm of Mastership, 5 LAW & CRITIQUE 149 (1994). As Tim Murphy (from the
Gaelic muir, meaning sea, and cadh, meaning warrior, and thence floating or shifting
adversary) puts it in an article contemporary with Schutz's, "[l]aw is no longer an arrow
sent from an outside (a God, a King, a Judge) into the deep interiors of the human
heart
" W.T. Murphy, Systems of Systems: Some Issues in the Relationship Between
Law and Autopoiesis, 5 LAW & CRITIQUE 241, 263 (1994).
1" See, e.g., John E. Sexton, "Out Of The Box" Thinking About The Training Of
Lawyers In the Next Millennium, 33 U. TQL. L. REV. 189 (2001); Note, Toward A
Constitutional Definition Of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (1978); John E. Sexton,
Charles W. Eliot, Unitarian Exponent of the Doctrine of Tolerance in Religion (1978)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Fordham University) (on file with the Fordham
University Library).
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has become steward of a larger ward. His successor at NYU law
school, Revesz—from the Latin rebellis and the Old French revel,
both meaning to rebel, is likely to rein back his predecessor's
innovations.
Shapiro, Scott [Cardozo School of Law] From the Hebrew shapir
meaning fair or lovely. Scott an ethnic name for someone from
Scotland, though its original referent is someone from Ireland and
connected to the Old Welsh (celtic) ysgthru, to cut, whose root lies
in the celtic habit of tattooing themselves with iron points.
Rhetorical figure paronomasia or wordplay. Fated by name to
love the Scots and thus married to a Scot. Destined to write
beautifully, and in a style that cuts, about very little. Thus an
innate or nominal predilection for analytic philosophy, a tradition
of wordplay, which the medievals termed "chop logic." The
alternate connotation of Scott, tattooing, suggests a facility to work
with the finest of points, to prick surfaces, to ornament the
appearance of things superficially though painfully.
By
nomination and inclination likely to be skilled in the philosophical
art of balancing angels on pinheads.""
Simpson, A.W. Brian (Sim-son) [University of Michigan School of
Law] From the Hebrew shemesh meaning sun and Biblical
reference or root is Samson, meaning great strength. An alternate
etymology derives from the Hebrew shama, to hearken. Brian
from the Celtic bre meaning hill and latterly connoting strength
and eloquence. Rhetorical figure metalepsis or figure of the far
fetched understood in a literal sense, namely someone who seeks
very distant causes for present effects. Twice named strong, he is
fated to being an eminent scholar. Preordained to hearkening or
listening to the sources of law and thus to being a renowned
historian, an archivist and archaeologist of common law and of
curious cases."^ Author of coruscating histories of Land Law and
of Contracts and also editor of the somewhat unadventurous
Biographical Dictionary^'' The multiple references to strength
and to the figure of Samson also suggest a powerful polemical
ability as witnessed best in an utterly scathing review of the work
of another legal historian, Morton Horowitz."^
'1'' Editor most recently, with the necessarily hard-working Jules Coleman, of THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (Jules Coleman &
Scott Shapiro eds., 2002).
"5 See, e.g., A.W.B. SIMPSON, LEADING CASES OF COMMON LAW (1995).
IK- A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW (2d ed. 1986); A.W.B. SIMPSON,
supra note 6; BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE COMMON LAW, supra note 34.
A.W.B. Simpson, The Horowitz Thesis And The History of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L.
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stone, Christopher (Stoe-en) lUnivetsity of Southern »
School of Law] Meaning stone. Christopher from the Greek
KhZophoros, Laning bearer of Christ, and in legend the^
saint of travelers. Rhetorical figure, aenigma or speaker of riddles^
Destined by name to be impermeable and unyielding, as m bio ^
from a stone." Cognate also, however, with the "philosopher s
stone" and thence preordained to be an esoteric philosopher of
C LdTeacher of tSethod. Co-author, with Bishin, of a casebook
on Law, Language and Ethics', and author of ^ a"''?®
"Should Trees Have Standing?"'" Recently
Aee and tribal rights to Neolithic remains. Nominally fated to
police or at least watch over the points of transition
and other disciplines, to pronounce upon the truth as between he
points passed over, and to mark and irrefragably defend the
boundaries thus enacted. Predestined philosophically to live out
his name; should stone have standing. Thus cognate with standing
stone, and milestone.
Stone Martin (Stoned) [Cardozo School of Law] leaning
obdurate. Martin from the Latin Martinus with a root m Martialis
emanating of or belonging to Mars, the god of fertility and war.
ITemate^tymologies derive from the German marten meaning
market and by extension to bargain; and the French
meaning, amongst other things, non-conformist scholar. Also the
name of a bird, the martin, a nesting creature but also a migrator,
restless like the birds of the law: aviarumiuns civilis as they were
anciently known because of their tendency to fly and flock.
Rhetorical figure praesumptio, the anticipator or anxious o .
Fated nominally to a hard path and thence the aporetic and most
usually dissident existence of the scholar. Destined J® the itinera
and in worldly terms impoverished or stony life of the mind^ T
original martinets, it might be recollected, were scholars
unfttached to any College: they lived between the eaves, ^hey
were homeless. The hermeneut also lives between the lines. Thus
a philosopher and a lawyer whose raison d'etre is to bargain with
words to interpret-from the Latin mter-pretium or to negotiate
S' He quibbles endlessly, he haggles over meaning as
mTrchants haggle over prices. By character a migrant and m
philosophical terms a militant. His first published work was an

wLUAM. R. BISHIN & CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, ^AW, LANGUAGE,
(1972); CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE TA
ESSAYS ON LAW, MORALS AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1996).

GTHICS
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essay criticizing the super-liberalism of the critical legal scholar
Roberto Unger for being insufficiently radical, and ineptly
critical."' In a recent work on formalism in law, Stone again
criticizes the critics but leaves open for future interpretation the
viability of the critique of formalism. At the end of a densely
worded article of some forty pages in length, he concludes in the
military style of Fabius Maximus Cunctator (the Roman general
most famous for endlessly delaying any engagement with the
invading Carthaginians, so much so that they eventually got
exhausted and returned home) by stating: "A critical discussion
remains, however, for another occasion.
Stone Suzanne Last (Stow-en) [Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva
University] From the Old English stan, meaning stone, and
referring, amongst other things, to someone who lived on stony
ground. Suzanne meaning lily. Last from the Middle English lest,
referring to the wooden form used for repairing shoes; or from the
Rhetorical figure
German last, meaning burden or load.
topographia or description of place.
Destined to travel
extensively, to absorb other cultures, to describe and incorporate
other disciplines and places. Fated to bear the burden of alien
tradition and of new forms alike. Author of "/n Pursuit of the
Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model in
Contemporary American Legal Theory."^^^
In sum or m
combination of her three names, stone—flower, shoe and
burden—she is appositely both an exhaustive researcher, one who
leaves no stone unturned, and an explorer whose travels or
searches are prompted by the paucity of fertile soil in her home
environment (itself an exile).
Teubner, Gunther (Toyb-ner) [University of Frankfurt] From the
German Taube meaning dove. Often an occupational name for
someone who keeps pigeons or doves and thence a nickname for
someone mild and devoted to classification or pigeonholing.
Gunther from the German element gund meaning battle and hen
meaning army. Rhetorical figure traductio, the transferrer or in
Puttenham's excellent lexicon "the tranlacer.
Destined to the
role of mediator and transcriber between discourses and traditions.

"9 Martin Stone. The

Placement of

REPRESENTATIONS 78 (1990).

Politics in

Roberto Unger's Politics, 30

Martin Stone, Formalism, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 114, at 205.
121 Suzanne Last Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The Turn To The Jewish Legal
Model In Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1993).
122 puTTENHAM, supra note 36, at 203.
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Preordained to introduce continental theories into common law.
Devoted much of his career to the translation of Luhmann's
theory of "autopoiesis" into legal studies.'^^ Played with other
contraries and mediated between deconstruction and autopoiesis,
the art of Lorenzetti and the theory of contracts. Has written
extensively on the postmodern "collision of discourses" and has
managed skillfully to talk between and across traditions and
discourses and thus to sooth polemical brows.
Thomas, Kendall (Tome-mass) [Columbia Law School] From the
Aramaic for twin, of biblical origin and best known as the name of
one of the disciples who doubted Christ's resurrection, and hence
the expression "doubting Thomas." Kendall from the Old Norse
kelda meaning spring and dalr meaning valley. Rhetorical figure
aporia, the skeptic or doubter. Destined to be unquenchably
skeptical, a thinker who rethinks, questions or challenges the given
histories of law and truth. Preordained to intellectual projects
against convention, and so to critique. Author of "Rouge et Noir
Reread";^^^ a founder of the critical race theory movement; a
postmodernist—an epistemological skeptic—and latterly a scholar
and proponent of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as an
alternative or supplement to law.
Unger, Roberto (Anger) [Harvard Law School] From the
German for a Magyar or someone from Hungary. Also a
nickname for someone who had trading or other connections with
Hungary. Alternate etymologies include the German unruhe
meaning restless or quarrelsome person; the Medieval Latin
ungebendeus meaning without summons; and ungles from the
Anglo-Scandinavian meaning "wolf-kettle." Roberto from the
German hrod meaning renown and berht meaning bright and
latterly famous.
Rhetorical figure ecphonesis, the figure of
passionate exclamation or the outcry. The connotations of
Hungary are obscure but must include a history of more wars, of a
country overrun and occupied more times than any other in
123 GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM (1993).
12'' See Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism, 13
CARDOZO L. REV. 1443 (1992); Gunther Teubner, De Collisione Discursuum.Communicative Rationalities in Law, Morality, and Politics, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 901
(1996); Gunther Teubner, The King's Many Bodies: The Self-Deconstruction of Law's
Hierarchy, 31 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 763 (1997); GUNTHER TEUBNER, Altera pars Audiatur;
Law in the Collision of Discourses, in LAW, SOCIETY AND ECONOMY (Richard Rawlings
ed., 1997).
'25 KENDALL THOMAS, Rouge et Noir Reread: A Popular Constitutional History of the
Angelo Herndon Case, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED
THE MOVEMENT (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
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Europe. It should also be noted that Hotman reports that in the
1460s, Mattias Corvinus (Matthew the Crow), King of Hungary,
expelled all the lawyers.^^® Destined to brilliant quarrelling,
sudden interventions, and the formulation of surprising
connections. An anti-lawyer who has intoned and preached faith
in the individual, in freedom and imagination, and in direct
democracy. Founding figure, some would say prophet, of critical
legal studies. Ends his first book with the cry "Speak, God."^^^
Subsequently authored the first programmatic statement of critical
legal studies conceived as "deviationist doctrine."^^^ Has gone on
to rail against psychology, necessity, and extant institutions.^^'
Williams, Patricia (Whil-yams) [Columbia Law School] Williams
from Old French wil meaning desire and helm meaning helmet.
Patricia from Latin Patrician or of noble descent. Cognate with
William Tell—meaning William tells or storyteller and soothsayer.
Rhetorical figure icon, that of image or likeness whereby argument
is built upon the most finely depicted images or likenesses of
persons and things. Destined to literary nobility, to take risks, tell
stories and address the vulnerability or truth of desire. Author of
the Alchemy of Race and Rights, and of Seeing a Color Blind
Future, Williams re-wrote late twentieth century legal theory. A
founder of the critical race theory movement, Williams introduced
narrative into jurisprudence and put the fiction back into legal
fiction.^^ Writing about race and law, about ancestors who were
slaves, about white colleagues who ignored race, was never likely
to be entirely popular and the helmet that her name implies has
often been necessary."^
Wiseman, Sir Robert (Wyse-mun) [Seventeenth century English
civilian jurist] From the Middle English wise meaning wise,
nickname for a wise or learned person. Alternate etymology from
Old English hwita meaning white. Robert from the Germanic
126 HOTMAN, ANTITRIBONIAN, supra note 82, at 144-45.
127 ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLITICS 295 (1975).
128 ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT
(1983).
1211 ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, PASSION; AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY (1984);
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL
THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY (1987); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA
UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? (1996), ROBERTO MANGABEIRA
UNGER, DEMOCRACY REALIZED: THE PROGRESSIVE ALTERNATIVE (1998).
130 PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); PATRICIA J.
WILLIAMS, SEEING A COLOR BLIND FUTURE (1997).
131 For a brief accounting, see Peter Goodrich & Linda G. Mills, The Law of White
Spaces: Race, Culture and Legal Education, 51 J. LEGAL BDUC. 15 (2001).
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hrod meaning renown and berht meaning bright. Rhetorical figure
dialogismus or the right reasoner. Twice destined for brilliance.
Fated to learning, meaning a knowledge of the classics and an
appreciation of Roman law. Preordained to doubt and rectify
common law method. In his major work Lex Legum or Law of
Laws, Wiseman lengthily impugned the wisdom and the logic of
arguments from precedent.'^^ Why repeat an error? Good
question, wise man.
Yablon, Chuck (Yahb-lon) [Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva
University] From the Polish Jablonski, meaning apple tree and
latterly referring to the trade of apple seller. Biblical connotations
of the tree of knowledge which so attracted Adam and Eve.
Chuck from Old English such, meaning tree and later stump, and
thus stout individual. Rhetorical figure asteismus (or urbanitas)
meaning refined and witty talk. Curious case of someone whose
first and last name bear cognate if not identical meanings.
Destined to scholarship and more specifically to the sharing of
dangerous knowledges. A stout intellectual, meaning one who is
solid in argument and resolute in defending their views.
Preordained to the sharing of wicked—in the sense of brilliant and
unconventional—opinions and insights. Urbane both in erudition
and in delivery. Author of numerous remarkable and dangerously
deconstructive articles, including: "-Forms" (on the significance and
boredom of legal forms); "Freud as a Law Professor: An
Alternative History"-, "Stupid Lawyer Tricks"-, "Judicial Drag"-,
"Baseball and Legal Theory.A tendency to ambivalence or
remorse which derives, one must suspect, from the dangers and the
price sometimes paid for knowledge. The fruit, one might say,
falls far from the tree.

SIR ROB WISEMAN, THE LAW OF LAWS: OR, THE EXCELLENCY OF THE CIVIL
LAW, ABOVE ALL OTHER HUMANE LAWS WHATSOEVER (London, Royston 1686)
(1664) (originally published as LEX LEGUM in 1656). This work is discussed in Peter
Gooodrich, Critical Legal Studies in England: Prospective Histories, 12 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 196 (1992).
In order of listing: Charles Yablon, Forms, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1349 (1990);
Charles Yablon, Freud as Law Professor: An Alternative History, 16 CARDOZO L. REV.
1439 (1995); Charles Yablon, Stupid Lawyer Tricks: An Essay on Discovery Abuse, 96

COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1996); Charles M. Yablon, Judicial Drag: An Essay on Wigs, Robes
and Legal Change, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 1129; Charles Yablon, On the Contribution of
Baseball to American Legal Theory, 104 YALE L.J. 227 (1994).
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HOMILETIC CONCLUSIONS

It is far easier to elaborate etymologies than to end a listing or
lexicon of names that could much more easily be endless. Once
the principle of arguments drawn from the name has been
canvassed it is indeed hard to prevent speculation or play upon the
meaning of the nominations that we daily encounter. Sugarman
will undoubtedly refer to someone who seeks to please, who sugars
their phrases and adds unction to conversation and transaction.
Cain will be a critic, Halley a comet or star, and Burnham an
inscriber or one who brands letters, instruments or contracts.
Mansfield will open new domains of law just as surely as Sunstein
will shine and Slaughter will be innocent. Posner will pose or take
positions, Fitzpatrick will please himself, Derrida will deride. Weir
will be weird, and Vismann strong.'^''
""I In order of listing, the references and concise etymologies are: David Sugarman
(University of Lancaster) from the German zucker meaning sugar. Rhetorical figure
euphemism. Legal historian famous for his bibliographies and the extravagant length of
his footnote references performing the roll call of collegiality and legitimation. Maureen
Cain (University of Birmingham), topographic name for someone who collected reeds,
widely used for making baskets, as well as floor and wall coverings. Maureen, from the
Hebrew Miryam, meaning sea of bitterness or sorrow. Biblical reference to Cain who
killed Abel. Rhetorical figure epitheton or the qualifier. A contrary in that Cain is a
friend of Rick Abel. She is a sociologist of law who wrote one of the first sociologies of
policing, also a leftist critic of law who has suffered significant career disadvantages by
virtue of her gender and her political views. Janet Halley (Harvard University), from Old
English heah meaning high. Also a reference to the eponymous comet. Meteoric rise.
Recently moved from Stanford to Harvard. Scott Burnham (University of Montana),
pronounced "burn-em", signifying the historical archetype of contract, the letter burned
on the forehead, the branding of cattle, and so on. Mr K. in that he is the only professor of
Contracts in Montana. Lord Mansfield (Judge 1705-1793) from Mam meaning breast and
feld meaning pasture or field. Destined thus to carry the common law in his breast {omnia
scrinia habet in pectore sua), and to open up new vistas of common law, which he duly did.
Cass Sunstein (University of Chicago), from the German sonnenshein meaning sunshine.
The most prolific author in the U.S. legal academy. Marty Slaughter (University of Kent),
Old English occupational name from slaht meaning killing. Marty from the Aramaic for
sorrowful or mistress. Author of an important book on universal languages, yet rebuffed
from the U.S. legal academy. Richard Posner (University of Chicago and Judge),
pronounce "pose-ner", comes up on spell-check as poser. A position taker, as witnessed
by his extraordinary productivity and by his increasingly dispeptic polemics. For recent
examples, see Richard A. Posner, What Has Modern Literary Theory to Offer Law?, 53
STAN. L. REV. 195 (2000), and RICHARD A. POSNER, PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS: A STUDY
OF DECLINE (2001). Peter Fitzpatrick (fits-patrick), author, inter alia, of MODERNISM
AND THE GROUNDS OF LAW (2001), a work of postmodern legal theory that some have
found to exhibit a somewhat solipsistic relationship to language. See Tim Murphy, Include
Me Out, 29 J.L. & Soc'Y 342 (2002). Jacques Derrida (Paris and Cardozo Law School) is
interpellated by spell-check as deride, accurately signifying the intense irritation that
grammatology and specifically though not necessarily accurately deconstruction has
caused the legal academy. Etymologically from ridere to ride, which fits. Tony Weir
(University of Cambridge) from the Old English Gaelic core meaning weir or stepping

1354

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:3

The elaborations follow swiftly upon introduction, and the
plays or interpretations can rapidly inform, amuse, rhyme and
interpret the persona that nomination presents. In retrospect,
armed with even a passing familiarity with etymologies, the history
of a discipline and the trajectory of a career can alike be
summarized by reference to the names that marked its path and
signposted the directions that it took. My own career, to adopt the
personal motif from which my final arguments will be drawn, was
marked by just such apposite indexes or names. Consider a few
incidents that are highly personal yet also wholly impersonal if one
accepts that a name bears an etymological and so supra-individual
meaning.
My decision to become a jurist was the result of a
conversation with a professor who paradoxically confronted me,
shortly before my graduation, with the question: "will you now be
going through the production line of the Bar." His name was Paul
Wiles, from the old English wil meaning contrivance or trick and
later meaning trap or snare from which modern English derives
the notions of wiles or ruses, of the wily and of wiliness. My
predisposition to academic and specifically to political study of law
had been gained slightly earlier in the seminars of a Marxist
professor of legal theory, Tony Richardson. Already rehearsed,
Richard comes from powerful ruler, and my teacher, who
constantly averred the desirability as well as the immanence of
"the revolution," instilled in me great awe for the political function
and manipulations of legal rules.
That I proceeded to write a doctorate in legal theory cannot
be entirely unconnected to the fact that my supervisor or
dissertation adviser was named Zenon Bankowski. He was a selfprofessed anarchist and contrived so to confuse me as to the
meaning and purpose of law as to force me into foundational or at
least methodological and theoretical studies. Zenon from xenos,
meaning stranger or other, and Bankowski from the Polish banka
meaning "bulging vessel" could not be bettered as a nomination
for someone stuffed full not of law points but of doubt and of what
was back then termed "otherness" or alienation."' Is it any
surprise that when I looked for guidance as to the tradition and the
stones. Alternately from Old Saxon wurd meaing fate and hence the mysterious, uncanny,
and odd. Author of a devastating review of a colleagues work. Cornelia Vismann
(University of Frankfurt am Oder), from the Latin vis, meaning power, and thence
powerful intellect. Author of a pioneering study of the history of filing systems, a small
part of which yet to be translated masterpiece, can be found in Cornelia Vismann, Cancels:
On the Making of Law in Chanceries, 1 LAW & CRITIQUE 131 (1996).
"5 I trace this history and etymology in Peter Goodrich, Zenotypes: On the Modes of
Reproduction of Critical Lawyers, 11 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 425 (2002).
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role of theory in law, it was Neil MacCormick, discussed above,
who taught me how to be a dutiful son, a follower within the
tradition even while flouting it? By the same token, it is almost
predicable that the Dean who first saw fit to invite me to visit a law
school in the United States was called Price, from the Latin
pretium meaning precious and thence value and interpretation, the
latter word deriving from inter-pretium or the negotiation of
meaning.
Price was in nominalist terms destined to be a
practitioner of hermeneutics and thus someone who would be
open to appointing a scholar whose primary interests lay in
linguistics, discourse analysis and semiotics—to the multiple study
of signs—to a job in the legal academy. Years later when I was
appointed to a Chair in the University of London to found a Law
School at Birkbeck College, the Master of the College who made
the appointment after the briefest of interviews was Baroness
Blackstone, not so much the name of a Master as of the common
law itself. When, finally, I moved from England to the United
States the motive was love and the name of the scholar who turned
me around amorously, geographically and theoretically was Linda
Mills, a name which in one etymology implies to turn by means of
love.
The ripple effect of nomination or of the meaning of names
returns us to the question of the normative significance of naming.
According to the Accursian gloss adverted to earlier—that the
name inheres in the bones—the Western legal tradition, from
antiquity onwards, was in no doubt that the name both legislated a
status and inscribed the obligation to live up to that inscription.
The name, like the letter, was in origin a branding, a contract and
so a structure. The name Accursius, delightfully enough, derives
from the Latin accursus, meaning to aid and to run up or to and
fro, with cognate forms of curso, cursus and cursor, to run to and
fro, to weave between, and thence to the modern cursor or text
marker and cursive or written by hand into the text. All of which
is to say that nomination destined Accursius to be a glossator or
interweaver of texts and his Glossa Ordinaria was appropriately
enough both the standard-setting gloss on the Digest and also the
source of the specific gloss that in doctrinal terms legitimates this
Dictionary.
That the name Accursius should mean glossator and that the
man who most famously inhabited that name should be not simply
a glossator but the most famous and arguably the best of all of the
glossators is a telling instance of the thesis that this Dictionary
propounds. That Accursius should be the source of the gloss
which defines the name as an obligation both illustrates and
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instantiates the point that is argued here. The name is significant
and particularly for lawyers that truism should not be dismissed or
set aside. We are as a legal culture contemporarily in the habit of
ignoring the history and the dictate or purchase of names. This
seems upon reflection and almost immediately self-defeating and a
form of denial. We are surrounded by names, by the circulation of
names, by a media and a star system, by a market and economy, in
which names bear reputations and values that determine both trust
and credibility and yet we somehow also contrive to believe that
names are irrelevant, that names are personal and not a fit matter
of discussion or argument.
The Accursian gloss and this laconic Dictionary can perhaps
form the basis of a contrary argument. Our ignorance or even fear
of making arguments from names reflects a neglect of rhetoric in
the public sphere and the subordination of the individual or the
orator to corporate causes or bureaucratic demands.
In
professional discourse this expropriation of the singular, of the
name, usually takes the form of announcing the priority of
scientific method and the precedence of "truth" or objectivity over
the subjective and merely nominal. It is believed that the name is
personal and any argument derived from or supported by the
name is an impermissible form of ad hominem reasoning that
traduces the universal in favor of the particular, and specifically
the private idiosyncrasy of the subject. The ad hominem argument
is in this view to be conceived as extrinsic to the public sphere of
knowledge and is frequently also deemed vindictive, vengeful,
improper, immoral and cruel. Two refutations, one cultural and
one theoretical, will serve as a conclusion.
The distinction between public and private, between the
permissible and the unspeakable or hidden, has been erased or
redrafted in most of the social sciences as well as in the
experiences of our everyday lives.Personal archives,
biographical writings, conceptions of counter public and even
intimate public spheres are commonplaces within the majority of
contemporary inter-disciplines. Feminism and queer theory have
made short shrift both of the concept of a discrete and hermetic
private sphere and of the notion that in the gynaeceum, or the
realm of the personal, knowledge somehow gives way to fantasy,
thought to idiocy, and truth to lies. Public and private spheres now
mix and shift their boundaries in temporary and local ways. The
public is in the private and the intimate is constantly acted out in
On the complexity of this issue, see MICHAEL WARNER, PUBLICS AND
COUNTERPUBLICS (2002). See also the excellent essays collected in INTIMACY (Lauren
Berlant ed., 2000).

2003]

THE OMENINNOMEN

1357

the market, in the media, and in the political realms. All of which
is to say that the boundaries neither hold up nor make sense. The
distinction between public and private neither any longer
meaningfully protects privacy nor does it salvage a lost legitimacy
for the public sphere.
There is no avoiding the intimacy of encounters or the names
of those encountered. Be it in the domain of law or of literature
opinions will circulate and arguments will be made in relation to
names and those that they nominate: reputations will be formed,
criticisms formulated, and polemics engaged.
Presently
professional etiquette favors hiding or denying the ad hominem
character of the arguments we draw from or direct towards names.
We tend to be less than honest as to the feelings that motivate and
circumscribe our professional judgments and decisions. We deny
their intimacy, their historical and biographical contours. Without
developing that observation here, it can simply be pointed out by
way of a second refutation that the name is the exemplary form of
the combination or imbrication of public and private, intimate and
economic.
The name is precisely a sign of the personal and intimate in its
most public and supra-personal or objective manifestation. The
name is personal and singular yet also infinitely old, wholly
exterior, and quite impersonal. Turning to the phone book or the
web, I find, and at times to my chagrin, any number of further
instances of Peter Goodrich: I am not alone, I am not unique, I
even share my names, personal and familial, with numerous other
Peter Goodriches, let alone with the vast host of the eponymous
dead. Which means ultimately that to own my name is precisely to
make arguments about it and to draw meanings from it. For the
name to inhere in the bones requires that the name be embodied
and expressed. Far from being unique in the senses adverted to
earlier in terms of the antique division between public and private,
the name is nothing or it is an argument. Those who have
succeeded in the sense either of distinction or of passion are those
who have lived out their names, which is to say they have made
something of them and at best turned them into arguments.
Freedom in one definition is the choice of necessity. Our
relationship to our name—to our family, our lineage, our self—is
just such a choice, an adaptation or confrontation with a structure,
an accounting of unconscious and excessive forces. To play with
names, to argue from names, to find meaning in names, is a sadly
neglected rhetorical or persuasive pursuit. We encounter it most
often in the everyday in the flippant mode of punning (classically
paronomasia or play upon words). Placentinus, from placenta, is
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at the beginning. Duck, meaning zero, counts for nothing. Selden
is seldom read. Dicey is not to be trusted. Fortescue, loosely
strongly askew, gets things strongly wrong.
Hooker is
promiscuous. Holmes looks for clues. Locke holds the key, and
Mills (in this instance John Stuart) grinds on.
In more
contemporary nominations, Calabresi calibrates; Farmer tills or
more archaically husbands; Habermas holds masses; Rawls is a
plug; Fletcher fires arrows; Mootz holds questionable opinions;
Peller rolls; Butler writes about what she saw; Twining is confused;
and Finnis is a Latinist and obsessed with ends to boot.'" In the
same vein Post sends things on; Handler is well composed; Gross is
noticeable; J.C. Smith is vicarius Dei; Kramer is full of facts; Fish is
slippery; Carty will work hard; Scheck is on the money; Pottage
makes a diaphanous soup of words; Winter (in the Western
Hemisphere) will be dark and cold, and so on into the infinite
future.Such lucid phonetic and semantic plays, as Freud pointed
out at length, have a close proximity to underlying or unconscious
structures and causes.'" We encounter them as a residual poetry
in everyday life, as good or bad arguments, as aesthetic or poor
expressions of taste. We encounter them in analysis as signs or
symptoms of untended causes.
The epistemic impropriety or social immoralism of the pun
again draws its strength from the historical division between public
and private, and here the largely coincident distinction between
gravity and levity. The pun is not necessarily the only or the best
argument from a name but it is nonetheless one such, meaning
both an argument and a play upon real signs. When analysis
moves from the everyday of punning to the scholarly and
rhetorical roles of etymologies it becomes even harder to ignore
the significance of names. The hygienic distinction between word
and referent, the linguistics that claims that the referent
determines the word, that the word or name is but a transparent
cipher, has collapsed long ago in linguistics. The words we use are
the words we use. Our discourse carries meanings that are social.
John Finnis (University of Oxford and Notre Dame), Catholic theologian of law,
opposed to abortion and to euthanasia. Finnis is most famous for a book that takes the
antique theology of natural law seriously—law is defined by its natural or God given ends.
Deserves his own entry but space is limited. Finnis being an alternate spelling of the Latin
finis meaning boundary or end. Author of JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL
RIGHT (1980). His work has been brilliantly excoriated in C. Douzinas & R. Warrington,
On the Deconstruction of Jurisprudence: Fin(n)is Philosophiae, 14 J. L. & SOC'Y 33 (1987).
For references to these names, see ASS'N OF AM. L. SCH., THE AALS DIRECTORY

OF LAW TEACHERS: 2001-2002 (2001); SOC'Y OF LEGAL SCHOLARS, DIRECTORY OF
MEMBERS (2002).
SIGMUND FREUD, JOKES AND THEIR RELATION TO THE UNCONSCIOUS (James
Strachy trans., 1960).
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exterior, and independent of intent or inner authorial truth. So
too we may bear our name but we are also carried by it. Put it like
this, if the name of an interlocutor is of no interest to you, then
that is a bad sign for them as well as a bad sign for you. Where
Renaissance orators were wont to state that "he is half hanged,
that has an evil name,""" we might wish to offer a more optimistic
or media friendly version of the same thesis: "a good name is the
first step on the path to fame."

WILSON, supra note 9, at sig. 48v.

